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Overview
Corporations are very common in the business world. In this kind of organizations
shareholders are protected by limited liability and, furthermore, they can easily transfer
their shares. As a consequence, investors might be interested in buying a corporation's
shares just to diversify their portfolios, without any real interest in getting involved in
management. It is therefore much easier for corporations to obtain external finance than
other organizational forms, and this might well be the basic reason for their wide diffusion.
For the very same reason, however, it is necessary to hire professional managers to make
all the relevant decisions, and this contains the seed of their problematic governance. In
fact, the separation of ownership and control produces a conflict of interest between share-
holders, interested in maximizing the firm value, and managers, who can be interested in
pursuing a variety of different objectives (empire building, entrenchment, shirking, etc.).
This dissertation is composed by three research papers dealing with the economics
of managerial incentive provision. It is common to interpret the relationship between
shareholders and managers as an agency relationship affected by both a moral hazard
and adverse selection problem. Usually, managerial incentives are affected by several
elements such as, for example, their compensation packages and career concerns, the
internal monitoring of the board of directors, the external monitoring of the market for
corporate control, etc. This dissertation suggests that it might be necessary to consider
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the interactions between alternative incentive mechanisms both to better understand their
functioning and, at least as importantly, to help interpreting empirical observations.
The first chapter, Paying for Observable Luck, proposes a simple hidden action model
which explains recent empirical evidence of asymmetric benchmarking in managerial com-
pensation: managers appear to be insulated from bad luck but not from good luck. The
explanation hinges on the interaction between explicit contractual incentives and im-
plicit incentives deriving from the possibility of bankruptcy. The second chapter, Career
Concerns and Competitive Pressure, studies how the level of competition in the product
market affects the strength of managerial career concerns. Good managers are in short
supply so that firms are willing to compete for them. However, the value of good man-
agers depends on the profit differential they are able to produce on the product market.
It is then shown that increased competition makes career concerns stronger if it increases
such profit differential. The third chapter, Managerial Entrenchment and the Market
for CEOs, suggests that the observed trends of increased managerial pay and increased
board independence might be related. Boards captured by an entrenched managers are
not active on the demand side of the managerial labor market. Therefore, increased
board independence, reducing the number of captured boards, also increases competition
for good managers, then rising their pay and making their career concerns stronger.
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Chapter 1
Paying for Observable Luck
In this chapter I present a simple hidden action model in which the agent has explicit
contractual incentives but also implicit incentives created by the possibility of bankruptcy.
An observable exogenous shock affects the agent's performance and determines the prob-
ability of liquidation. Furthermore, after signing the contract, but before choosing his
action, the agent observes a private signal on the future shock. The observation of a bad
signal strengthens the agent's implicit incentive and reduces the conflict of interest with
the principal. If the agent had no private information, the principal could completely
filter out the observable luck. However, when the agent has private information, the con-
tract optimally adjusts explicit to implicit incentives. As a result, observable luck is not
completely removed from the agent compensation schedule. The model explains recent
empirical evidence of asymmetric benchmarking in managerial compensation: managers
appear to be insulated from bad luck but not from good luck. The result obtains in a
model that shares most of the assumptions typically made in the empirical literature.
In particular, asymmetric benchmarking arises even though the managerial productivity
and the exogenous shock are independent.
Keywords: Pay for Luck, Asymmetric Benchmarking, Relative Performance Evalu-
ation.
JEL classification: D82, D86, M52.
Chapter 1. Paying for Observable Luck 7
1.1. Introduction
The relationship between shareholders of a modern public corporation and their CEOs
has long been studied within the framework of agency theory. This approach stresses the
trade off between insurance and incentive provision in the design of optimal contracts.
Shareholders are typically well diversified and then better suited than their risk averse
managers to bear the uncertainty affecting firm performance. As a consequence manage-
rial exposure to risk finds its only rationale in the provision of incentives. Therefore, any
noise that could be removed from CEOs' compensation packages, without affecting under-
lying incentives, should indeed be filtered out. This intuitive idea is a direct consequence
of the informativeness principle (Holmstrom, 1979) and it is usually believed to imply that
managerial compensation should be insulated from events that are beyond their control
such as, for example, macroeconomic fluctuations. To do this one should evaluate firm
performance relative to some appropriate benchmark, that reflects stochastic elements
which cannot be affected by managerial activity. For example, the widely recommended
use of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) hinges on the idea that performances
within a group of peers (e.g. CEOs within the same industry) are affected by common
shocks. Hence, it is argued, compensation should be increasing in own performance
but decreasing in others'. Other typical recommended benchmarks include stock price
indexes, input and output prices.
In spite of its intuitive appeal, this apparently straightforward implication of agency
theory has found very limited support in the data.1 In contrast, the recent works by
Bannister and Newman (2003) and Garvey and Milbourn (2006) suggest the existence
of a form of asymmetric benchmarking: managers appear to be insulated from bad luck
but not from good luck.2 For example, in stock option plans the strike price typically
coincides with the market price at the time of award and it is not linked to general stock
price indexes. In this way managers can appropriate windfalls generated by a bull market,
1 See for example the surveys by Rosen (1992), Murphy (1999) or Prendergast (1999).
2 When the adopted benchmark is relative performance, this phenomenon is also referred to as one
sided RPE.
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as it seems to have happened during the 1990s. However, when the stock price falls below
the exercise price, it is often renegotiated down.3
The typical principal-agent model that supports the idea that managerial compensa-
tion should be decreasing in an appropriate benchmark is indeed very simple. Usually, it
involves a standard hidden action model in which the firm performance is represented as
the sum of three independent components: managerial productivity, an aggregate shock
and a noise term. However, it is possible to modify this basic structure to produce
contractual arrangements in which compensation is not decreasing in the benchmark.
For example, in Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000), and Celentani and Loveira (2006), the
managerial productivity is correlated with the aggregate state and, in this case, opti-
mal benchmarking does not necessarily involve a smaller payment when the performance
benchmark is high.
The lack of appropriate benchmarking in managerial compensation has however been
considered by some authors as striking evidence of executive self dealing. Crystal (1991),
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2002) have pointed
out that CEOs might have an important influence on their own pay process. According to
this view, CEOs would manipulate the members of the compensation committee in order
to obtain the most favorable conditions, just trying to avoid the shareholders' outrage.
However, as Garvey and Milbourn (2006) have argued, it is not clear why the complete
absence of any form of benchmarking should be desirable for CEOs. If compensation
is linked to market movements, executives can only expect to receive the risk premium
determined in the market and it is not clear whether it is high enough for the given
managerial risk aversion. They also claim that asymmetric benchmarking is a more
robust signal of self serving behavior since managers would prefer it to no benchmarking
whatsoever.
This paper shows that asymmetric benchmarking can be a characteristic of opti-
mal contracts adopted by completely independent and self-interested principals. The
3 A common justification for this conduct is that with a stock price decline the plan loses its moti-
vational value (Murphy, 1999, and Garvey and Milbourn, 2006).
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main contribution is to show that, contrary to the general presumption, asymmetric
benchmarking can be obtained even when managerial productivity is independent of the
aggregate shock. The model stresses that, besides the contractual (explicit) incentives,
managers also respond to other sources of (implicit) incentives that shareholders should
take into account. In particular, I consider the indirect discipline created by bankruptcy:
when a firm performs poorly and gets liquidated its manager also suffers a cost. For
example, it could take some time to find a new job and, having performed poorly in the
previous one, new job conditions will presumably be less attractive.4 I also assume that,
after signing the contract but before choosing his action, the agent can observe a private
signal on the future state of the world (i.e. on the level of the benchmark). Bad luck,
reflected in low levels of the benchmark, makes performance levels below the liquidation
threshold more likely then sharpening indirect incentives. Since the agent observes the
private signal before choosing an action, he can base his conduct on this information. As
a consequence, the principal can provide the agent with different explicit incentives when
different signals are observed. Therefore, the optimal contract should mitigate explicit
incentives when the agent receives bad news because the relatively higher probability of
being liquidated provides sharper indirect incentives. Because the signal observed by the
manager is private, his compensation cannot be made contingent on it, but compensa-
tion depends on the firm's performance and on the realized state that are both public.
Furthermore, an ex-post low level of the benchmark makes it more likely that the signal
received by the agent was a bad one. Hence, to provide the agent with weaker incentives
when a bad signal is observed it is sufficient to make the compensation flatter when the
benchmark is low. Asymmetric benchmarking then arises from this characteristic of the
optimal contract: if the benchmark is high, compensation is more sensitive to the firm
outcome so that a good performance leads to a high managerial payment, however, when
the benchmark is low, the wage schedule is flatter so that a poor performance is not
penalized that much.
4 Schmidt (1997) offers the first formalization within a principal-agent model of the intuitive idea
that the probability of bankruptcy reduces the conflict of interest between stockholders and managers
interested in keeping their job.
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In the literature there are several papers that have tackled the puzzling absence of
RPE in managerial contracts. In a first strand of it, pioneered by Salas Fumás (1992) and
then followed, among others, by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Joh (1999), the main
focus is on product market interactions. It is stressed that, especially in tough competitive
environments, it could be in the interest of the firms' owners to sign contracts that make
managerial compensation increasing, instead of decreasing, in the market performance.
In this way their commitment not to maximize profits is credible and can enforce some
degree of collusion that, at the end, turns out to be better than straight competition.
In a different vein, Oyer (2004) and Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) stress the role of
participation constraints. If the value of the managerial outside opportunity is positively
correlated with wide industry movements, it could be necessary for the firms' owners to
pay more in case of good luck in order to keep the participation constrained satisfied.
Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) also stress the role of the managerial labor market.
They notice that managerial talent is relatively more productive in good states of the
world so that the demand for high level executives increases during a boom period. At
the same time, the supply is relatively inelastic and, then, they predict a positive relation
between managerial pay and industry-wide performance, at least for the highest skilled
managers.
None of the papers mentioned so far is able to explain the evidence of asymmetric
benchmarking. In fact, their arguments always predict a positive relation between man-
agerial pay and the level of the benchmark so that they can at most be useful to explain the
observed mixed result on RPE. An exception is the recent work by Celentani and Loveira
(2006). In a simple principal agent model they obtain that one sided RPE is optimal if the
productivity of the managerial effort is sufficiently higher in the good state. Under this
assumption, the observation of a good performance is more suggestive of managerial high
effort in good times than in bad times and, similarly, poor performance is more suggestive
of managerial effort in bad states than in good ones. The corresponding optimal contract
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then displays asymmetric benchmarking. In other words, the correlation between the
aggregate state and managerial productivity can explain asymmetric benchmarking.5
In the model developed here, the relationship between firm performance, aggregate
state and managerial activity is a simple linear equation of the kind commonly used in em-
pirical studies and, even assuming independence between aggregate state and managerial
productivity, asymmetric benchmarking emerges as an optimal contractual arrangement.
The key element of the explanation is that for agents with a private information on the
strength of their implicit incentives, benchmarking is not only used to filter out observable
luck but also to adapt explicit incentives to the hidden information.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces a standard principal agent
model in which the agent performance is affected by an observable and uncontrollable
shock (the benchmark). Furthermore, performances below a given threshold trigger the
liquidation of the firm. In this framework the optimal benchmarking rule is obtained and
discussed. In section three I consider the possibility for the manager of observing a signal
on the future level of the benchmark. I first study optimal contracts that induce the
manager to exert unconditional effort, i.e., the level of effort he chooses is independent of
his private information. I show that, in this case, the optimal benchmarking rule displays
the kind of asymmetry observed in the data. I then characterize contracts that induce
the agent to exert conditional effort, i.e., his effort choice depends on the realization of
the private signal. Section 4 contains some numerical examples and, finally, section 5
concludes.
1.2. The Baseline Analysis of an Uninformed Agent
A principal (she) has to hire a manager (he) to implement an investment project
whose result x depends on a managerial action a ∈ {0, 1} , on an aggregate state variable
5 They also show that the opposite assumption naturally leads to the opposite result: if the manage-
rial effort is more productive in bad times then the managerial pay should appear to be insulated from
good luck but not from bad luck.
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y ∈ {B,G} and on a random term ξ according to:
x = γa+ y + ξ (1.1)
Action a can be interpreted as effort and can be high (a = 1) or low (a = 0). High
effort has a utility cost of c > 0 for the manager while low effort involves no such cost.
The term γ > 0 represents productivity of the managerial effort and is independent of the
aggregate state. The noise term ξ is normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2.
Finally, the binary variable y has a distribution p(y) and it captures stochastic elements
affecting the project result that are observable and verifiable. Assuming G > 0 and
B = 0, the value y = G can be interpreted as the favorable (Good) aggregate state while
y = B as the unfavorable (Bad) one. The project outcome x and the aggregate shock
y are both observable and verifiable and whenever x is below a critical value x ≤ 0, the
principal goes bankrupt. In this case the agent incurs a liquidation cost β > 0 which is
expressed in utility terms. The managerial action cannot be observed by the principal and
the idiosyncratic noise term ξ is not observable by anybody. All remaining parameters
are commonly known. In this framework a contract is a wage schedule of the form
w : R × {B,G} → [w, ∞), notice in particular that the manager is wealth constrained
so that feasible wage offers must be above the threshold w. The timing is as follows: the
principal offers a contract to the agent that can either accept or reject it. If the contract
is accepted, the manager has to decide whether to exert high or low effort. After such
decision, which remains hidden to the principal, the aggregate state y and the term ξ are
determined and then, the project outcome x is realized according to (1.1). Both x and
y are publicly observed and if the outcome is below the critical value, the principal goes
bankrupt. Finally, the wage payment is carried out.6 The principal is risk neutral and
maximizes total expected profits E(x−w), while the agent is risk averse with ex post utility
6 Notice in particular that the agent receives the promised wage payment even in case of bankruptcy.
It could be argued that a wage payment w(x, y) should belong to [w, x] to be credible and further
restrictions would be necessary in case of bankruptcy. However, including such restrictions wouldn't
affect any result and, therefore, it is for the sake of simplicity that I consider general contracts of the
type w : R× {B,G} → [w, ∞) .
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U(w, a, x) = u(w)−c(a)−β(x), where u : [w, ∞)→ R is twice continuously differentiable,
strictly increasing and concave, and satisfying limw→∞ u′(w) = 0 and limw→w+ u′(w) =
∞, c(1) = c > 0 and c(0) = 0, and, finally, β(x ≤ x) = β and β(x > x) = 0. The
agent also has an outside opportunity which is worth U to him. Notice that when the
agent chooses action a in state y, the outcome x is normally distributed with mean γa+y
and variance σ2. Let Fy(· , a) be the corresponding distribution function and fy(· , a) the
associated density. The probability of bankruptcy in state y when the agent's action is
a, is therefore Fy(x, a). The total probability of bankruptcy when the agent takes action
a is b(a) =
∑
y p(y)Fy(x, a). It is immediate to check that b(0) > b(1), meaning that high
effort reduces the probability of bankruptcy. Notice that the quantity [b(0)− b(1)]β is the
expected reduction in turnover costs induced by a = 1, so that it represents the implicit
value that effort has for the agent. Such quantity is increasing in β and, more importantly,
it is also increasing in the difference b(0) − b(1), i.e. the more effective high effort is in
taking the company away from bankruptcy, the higher its implicit value. Therefore, as in
Schmidt (1997), the possibility of bankruptcy creates an implicit incentive that mitigates
the conflict of interest with the principal. The minimum cost contract inducing high effort
solves:
min
w(x,z)≥w
∑
y
p(y)
∫
w(x, y)fy(x, 1)dx (1.2)
subject to: ∑
y
p(y)
∫
u [w(x, y)] fy(x, 1)dx ≥ U + c+ b(1)β (1.3)
∑
y
p(y)
∫
u [w(x, y)] [fy(x, 1)− fy(x, 0)] dx+ [b(0)− b(1)]β ≥ c. (1.4)
The incentive compatibility constraint (1.4) reflects the existence of both explicit incen-
tives, derived from the contract, and implicit incentives, derived from bankruptcy. If (1.4)
is satisfied, the agent finds it in his own interest to choose effort a = 1. For this to be the
case the value of effort, measured on the left hand side of (1.4) must be not smaller than the
cost of effort reported on the right hand side. Notice that the value of effort is the sum of
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two components. First, the quantity
∑
y p(y)
∫
u [w(x, y)] [fy(x, 1)− fy(x, 0)] dxmeasures
the value of effort in inducing higher wage payments. This is an explicit incentive and is
controlled by the principal through the contract w : the higher the pay-for-performance
sensitivity, the higher the explicit value of effort. Second, the quantity [b(0)− b(1)]β
measures the implicit value of effort. Notice also that if [b(0)− b(1)]β ≥ c the agent
prefers to exert effort even when he is offered a flat wage schedule that gives effort no
explicit value. I rule out this possibility assuming that β < c[b(0)−b(1)] so that the agent's
bankruptcy cost is not sufficient to perfectly align his interest with that of the principal.
Let λ and µ be multipliers for constraints (1.3) and (1.4) respectively and define with
Ly(x) =
fy(x,1)−fy(x,0)
fy(x,1)
the likelihood ratio corresponding to outcome x in state y. Hence,
the minimum cost contract w∗ inducing the high level of effort satisfies the following
condition:
1
u′ [w∗(x, y)]
= λ+ µLy(x) (1.5)
for all pairs (x, y) for which (1.5) has a solution w∗(x, y) ≥ w, otherwise w∗(x, y) = w
whenever λ+ µLy(x) < 0. Notice that for a fixed a the density function of the outcome
in the favorable state is obtained shifting to the right the corresponding density in the
unfavorable state by the amount G, that is: fG(x + G, a) = fB(x, a). This also implies
that FG(x+G, a) = FB(x, a) and LG(x+G) = LB(x), and then also λ+ µLG(x+G) =
λ+ µLB(x), which in particular implies the following condition:
w∗(x+G,G) = w∗(x,B). (1.6)
Hence, if we denote with E (w∗ | y) the equilibrium expected wage in state y, an immediate
consequence of (1.6) is that:
E (w∗ |G) = E (w∗ |B) (1.7)
To verify this last condition just notice that:
E (w∗ |B) =
∫
w∗(x,B)fB(x, 1)dx =
∫
w∗(x+G,B)fG(x+G, 1)dx =
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w∗(x˜, G)fG(x˜, 1)dx˜ = E (w∗ |G)
where the last equality in the first line follows from the change of variable x˜ = x + G.
The expected wage payment is the same in both aggregate states so that, in expected
terms, there is no reward associated to observable luck. Figure 1 gives an illustration of
the optimal contract in this case.
This characteristics of the optimal wage schedule should not come as a surprise: the
variable y represents in fact a benchmark against which managerial performance can be
evaluated. Put it another way, the aggregate term y is beyond managerial control but,
nevertheless, it affects his performance. It is then optimal to filter it out by benchmarking
the managerial compensation according to the rule described in (1.6) that simply states
that in good times a given outcome x + G induces the same wage payment that would
have been induced in the unfavorable state by the smaller outcome x. In this way the risk
induced by the uncertain aggregate state is completely removed so that the risk averse
agent can be hired and properly motivated at a lower cost. As commonly obtained in this
class of models the resulting wage schedule is then decreasing in the benchmark.7
The benchmarking condition (1.6) has been obtained in a very simple model. In more
sophisticated environments it isn't necessarily so. For example, in Celentani and Loveira
(2006) the productivity of the managerial effort can vary across aggregate states and in
this case the simple benchmarking condition (1.6) no longer holds. In particular, they
show that, if effort productivity is sufficiently higher in good times than in bad times,
the optimal contract displays one sided RPE.8 In the following section I maintain the
hypothesis that effort productivity is independent of the aggregate state and nevertheless
7 Remember that the contract design problem has a statistical interpretation: the outcome x is used
as a signal about the managerial action and wage payments increases with the likelihood of the manager
having exerted high effort. Given the simple (linear) structure in equation 1.1, an outcome x + G in
favorable conditions has the same informational content about the managerial action as the outcome x
in bad times.
8 In terms of the model presented here, if managerial productivity in state y is denoted with γy and
the variability of the noise term ξ in state y is denoted with σ2y , it could be shown that if
γG
γB
> σB
σG
, the
optimal contract displays one sided benchmarking, that is, the wage payment is increasing in y above
some given performance threshold, and decreasing in y below it. However, this modified benchmarking
rule would still factor out completely the effect of luck, i.e. condition (1.7), would still hold.
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asymmetric benchmarking arises whenever the agent can observe a private signal on the
future state of the world.
1.3. Informed Agent
In the situation described in the previous section the probability of bankruptcy doesn't
play any role in shaping the benchmarking rule adopted in the optimal contract. However,
the utility cost that the manager suffers in case of bankruptcy mitigates the conflict of
interest with the principal. Notice also that, everything else being constant, the proba-
bility of bankruptcy is higher in bad times than in good times so that, if the agent were
able to forecast the future aggregate state, the agency problem would be less severe in
case bad times were anticipated to come. This idea suggests that if the agent is able
to observe some signal about the future level of y, the principal could find it optimal to
take advantage of the disciplining effect of bankruptcy, then, in particular, reducing the
managerial exposure to risk after the observation of bad news, and increasing it after good
news. As it will be shown in this section, the optimal contractual arrangement resulting
in this case exhibits asymmetric benchmarking.
Consider a private signal z that is received by the agent after signing the contract, but
before choosing the level of effort. The signal can either be good, z = G or bad, z = B,
and its conditional probability, given the future state of nature is given by:
ρ(z | y) =
 1− ε if z = yε if z 6= y
where ε ∈ [0, 12] measures how noisy the signal is. If ε = 0, the signal is perfectly
informative, while ε = 12 corresponds to a completely noisy signal.
9 Define with ρ(z) the
total probability of observing signal z, that is ρ(z) = (1− ε) p(y = z) + εp(y 6= z). The
9 In the latter case the agent is completely uninformed and the baseline analysis in the first section
applies.
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posterior probability of the future aggregate state held by the manager after receiving
signal z is:
p(y | z) = ρ(z | y)p(y)
ρ(z)
. (1.8)
It is a matter of simple computations to check that for any ε∈ [0, 12)
p(y | z = y) > p(y) > p(y | z 6= y),
meaning that the observation of signal z = y raises the conditional probability of ob-
serving state y in the future while the observation of signal z 6= y decreases it. De-
fine the conditional probability of bankruptcy given signal z and action a as b(a | z) =∑
y p(y | z)Fy(x, a). Notice that for both z = B, G, b(0 | z) > b(1 | z), i.e., whatever the
observed signal, high effort has always an implicit value because it reduces the conditional
probability of bankruptcy and, therefore, the expected cost of bankruptcy. However, the
following lemma shows that the implicit value of effort is higher if bad times are antici-
pated to come.
Lemma 1 The implicit value of effort increases after z = B and decreases after
z = G:
b(0 |B)− b(1 |B) > b(0)− b(1) > b(0 |G)− b(1 |G)
Proof Computing explicitly probabilities b(a) and b(a | z) and rearranging terms
yield:
b(a | z)− b(1 | z) =
∫ x
−∞
{p(G | z) [fG(x, 0)− fG(x, 1)] + p(B | z) [fB(x, 0)− fB(x, 1)]} dx,
b(0)− b(1) =
∫ x
−∞
{p(G) [fG(x, 0)− fG(x, 1)] + p(B) [fB(x, 0)− fB(x, 1)]} dx,
Notice that for x ≤ x ≤ 0 it results that fB(x, 0)− fB(x, 1) > fG(x, 0)− fG(x, 1) > 0 and
then the lemma immediately follows from the fact that p(G |G) > p(G) > p(G |B) and
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p(B |B) > p(B) > p(B |G). 
The interpretation of lemma 1 is straightforward: the observation of bad news strength-
ens implicit incentives because it makes high effort more valuable (i.e. more effective in
reducing the conditional probability of bankruptcy). Similarly, the observation of good
news makes bankruptcy a less important concern and relaxes implicit incentives. Notice
that the availability of the private signal for the agent enlarges his action space. He can
now condition the level of effort on his private forecast of the future aggregate state. Let
(aB , aG) be one such possible action profile where az ∈ {0, 1} represents effort chosen
after the observation of signal z. Notice that, because the private signal is correlated with
the aggregate state and the agent can condition his action on it, the managerial produc-
tivity, represented by the term γa in equation (1.1), can be correlated with the aggregate
state y even if productivity of the managerial high effort, represented by the term γ, is
independent of y. In particular, (aB , aG) = (1, 1), (0, 0) are unconditional effort profiles
and if the agent adopts one of them, there still is independence between the aggregate
state y and the managerial productivity γa. However, if the agent chooses a conditional
effort profile, i.e. (aB , aG) = (0, 1), (1, 0), there would be a correlation between aggregate
state and managerial product, even if the outcome is determined according to the simple
equation (1.1). In the rest of this section I will mainly focus on the minimum cost
contract implementing the unconditional effort profile (aB , aG) = (1, 1). It is important
to notice that, even if no correlation is produced by this contract, incentives constraints
must prevent the agent from choosing conditional action profiles that would create such
correlation. For this reason benchmarking is not only used to filter out observable luck
as in (1.6), but also to avoid such deviations.
Chapter 1. Paying for Observable Luck 19
1.3.1. Informed Agent Exerting Unconditional Effort
The minimum cost contract implementing high effort after both signals solves:
min
w(x,z)≥w
∑
y
p(y)
∫
w(x, y)fy(x, 1)dx (1.9)
subject to: ∑
y
p(y)
∫
u [w(x, y)] fy(x, 1)dx ≥ U + c+ b(0)β (1.10)
and for z ∈ {B,G}
∑
y
p(y | z)
∫
u [w(x, y)] [fy(x, 1)− fy(x, 0)] dx+ [b(0 | z)− b(1 | z)]β ≥ c (1.11)
The objective function in (1.9) and the (IR) constraint (1.10) are the same as in the
previous section, but now there are two incentive compatibility constraints in (1.11),
one for each possible realization of the private signal. Remember from lemma 1 that
b(0 |B) − b(1 |B) > b(0 |G) − b(1 |G) so that the IC constraint corresponding to the
observation of z = B is now less demanding, while after the observation of z = G sharper
explicit incentives are needed to induce the high level of effort. Let λ be the multiplier
for the IR constraint and µ(z)ρ(z) the multiplier for constraint IC with signal z. The
optimal wage schedule wε satisfies now the following condition:
1
u′ [wε(x, y)]
= λ+ [(1− ε)µ(z = y) + εµ(z 6= y)]Ly(x) (1.12)
for all pairs (x, y) for which (1.12) has a solution wε(x, y) ≥ w, otherwise wε(x, y) = w
whenever λ + [(1− ε)µ(z = y) + εµ(z 6= y)]Ly(x) < 0. The next proposition shows how
the availability of the private information modifies the simple benchmarking rule (1.6).
Proposition 1 For each ε ∈ [0, 12) the minimum cost contract wε(x, y) implementing
(aB , aG) = (1, 1) is unique and for both y = B,G it is a continuous function of x.
Furthermore, observable luck is not completely removed from managerial compensation.
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In particular, the following holds:
(1) if x > γ2 , then w
ε(x+G,G) > wε(x,B);
(2) if x < γ2 , then w
ε(x+G,G) ≤ wε(x,B);
(3) if λ = 0, then E (wε |G) > E (wε |B).
Proof Problem (1.9) - (1.11) defining the optimal wage schedule wε is not a convex
program. Following a common practice, it is better to define an equivalent problem stated
in terms of the utility levels u(w(x, y)). Let U be the range of the utility function u, and
h : U → [w,∞) be its inverse. Define u = u(w) and notice that h is twice continu-
ously differentiable, strictly increasing , strictly convex and such that limu→u h′(u) = 0
and limu→supU h′(u) = ∞. With a slight abuse of notation let's write u(x, y) to denote
u(w(x, y)) and notice that w(x, y) = h(u(x, y)). Consider now the following problem:
min
u(x,z)≥u
∑
y
p(y)
∫
h(u(x, y))fy(x, 1)dx (1.13)
subject to ∑
y
p(y)
∫
u(x, y)fy(x, 1)dx ≥ U + c+ b(1)β (1.14)
and for z ∈ {B,G}
∑
y
p(y | z)
∫
u(x, y) [fy(x, 1)− fy(x, 0)] dx+ [b(0 | z)− b(1 | z)]β ≥ c. (1.15)
This is now a convex program and it is equivalent to (1.9) - (1.11) in the sense that
uε(x, y) solves (1.13) - (1.15) if and only if wε(x, y) = h [uε(x, y)] solves (1.9) - (1.11).
Let λ be the multiplier for the IR constraint and µ(z)ρ(z) the multiplier for constraint
IC with signal z. The optimal utility schedule uε satisfies now the following condition:
h′ [u(x, y)] = λ+ [(1− ε)µ(z = y) + εµ(z 6= y)]Ly(x) (1.16)
for all pairs (x, y) for which (1.16) has a solution u(x, y) ≥ u, otherwise u(x, y) = u
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whenever λ+[(1− ε)µ(z = y) + εµ(z 6= y)]Ly(x) < 0. The advantage of this formulation
is that being (1.13) - (1.15) a convex program its solution is unique and multipliers λ, µ(B)
and µ(G) are non negative.
To facilitate the subsequent exposition, define xB = γ2 , and xG =
γ
2+G and notice that
the quantities fy(xy, 1)− fy(xy, 0) and Ly(x) have the same sign as x−xy. Furthermore,
simple algebra shows that for any v ≥ 0 , the following holds:
fy(xy + v, 1)− fy(xy + v, 0) =
1√
2piσ2
{
exp
[
− 1
2σ2
(
v − γ
2
)2]
− exp
[
− 1
2σ2
(
v +
γ
2
)2]}
≡ g(v)
which is independent of y. Similarly it can be noticed that for v ≥ 0:
fy(xy − v, 1)− fy(xy − v, 0) = g(−v) = −g(v)
i.e., the function g is odd. Using this new notation it is possible to write the IC constraint
associated to signal z in the following more convenient way:
∑
y
p(y | z)
∫ ∞
0
[u(xy + v, y)− u(xy − v, y)] g(v)dv + [b(0 | z)− b(1 | z)]β ≥ c.
The rest of the proof is organized in three steps.
Step 1 Let's show here that points (1) and (2) follow from µ(G) > µ(B) ≥ 0 that,
in turn, is established in step two. If ε ∈ [0, 12) and µ(G) > µ(B) ≥ 0 it is also true that
[(1− ε)µ(G) + εµ(B)] > [(1− ε)µ(B) + εµ(G)], so that, using the first order condition
(1.16), recalling that Ly(x) is larger for y = B and has the same sign of (x − xy), for
x > xB = γ2 , it results that:
h′ [u(x+G,G)] = λ+ [(1− ε)µ(G) + εµ(B)]LG(x+G) >
λ+ [(1− ε)µ(B) + εµ(G)]LG(x+G) =
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λ+ [(1− ε)µ(B) + εµ(G)]LB(x) = h′ [u(x,B)] .
Hence, being h an increasing and convex function, it results that uε(x+G,G) > uε(x,B)
which is the same as wε(x + G,G) > wε(x,B). As for x < xB = γ2 let's distinguish
two cases. Consider first the case in which λ + [(1− ε)µ(G) + εµ(B)]LG(x + G) ≥ 0.
Condition (1.16) still defines the optimal level of utility to be assigned to the manager
for both y = B,G so that, since LG(x+G) < 0, we have now:
h′ [u(x+G,G)] = λ+ [(1− ε)µ(G) + εµ(B)]LG(x+G) <
λ+ [(1− ε)µ(B) + εµ(G)]LG(x+G) =
λ+ [(1− ε)µ(B) + εµ(G)]LB(x) = h′ [u(x,B)] .
Hence, it follows that wε(x + G,G) < wε(x,B). In the second complementary case in
which λ + [(1− ε)µ(G) + εµ(B)]LG(x + G) < 0, we have that the wage offer is wε(x +
G,G) = w and then for sure not larger then wε(x,B). Finally, to establish continuity of the
schedule wε(x, z) it is sufficient to check that at the point ωy ≡ L−1y
(
− λ[(1−ε)µ(z=y)+εµ(z 6=y)]
)
it results that:
lim
x→ω+y
u(x, y) = lim
x→ω+y
h′−1 (λ+ [(1− ε)µ(z = y) + εµ(z 6= y)]Ly(x)) =
lim
υ→0+
h′−1(υ) = u
which is clearly true since, being h the inverse of u, h′ converges to 0 as its argument
converges to u.
Step 2 Let's show that µ(G) > µ(B) ≥ 0. Assume by contradiction that µ(B) ≥
µ(G) ≥ 0 and notice that the two IC multipliers cannot be both zero and then µ(B) > 0
follows, i.e. the IC constraint associated to signal B is binding. Now, similarly to what
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have been found in step 1, the first order condition (1.16) implies that
[uε(x+G,G)− uε(x,B)] (x− xB) ≤ 0
so that we can write:
∑
y
p(y |G)
∫ ∞
0
[u(xy + v,G)− u(xy − v,G)] g(v)dv =
∫ ∞
0
p(G |G) [u(xG + v,G)− u(xG − v,G)] + p(B |G) [u(xB + v,G)− u(xB − v,G)] g(v)dv ≤∫ ∞
0
p(G |B) [u(xG + v,B)− u(xG − v,B)] + p(B |B) [u(xB + v,B)− u(xB − v,B)] g(v)dv =
c− [b(0 |B)− b(1 |B)]β < c− [b(0 |G)− b(1 |G)]β
which clearly violates the incentive compatibility constraint corresponding to the signal
z = G. Notice that the first (weak) inequality follows from the fact that being v ≥ 0,
we also have u(xG + v,G) ≤ u(xB + v,B) and u(xG − v,G) ≥ u(xB − v,G) so that
u(xG + v,G)− u(xG − v,G) ≤ u(xB + v,B)− u(xB − v,B) and furthermore P (G |G) >
P (G |B), P (B |G) < P (B |B). The second (strict) inequality is a consequence of lemma
1.
Step 3 Let's finally show point (3) in the proposition. Notice that from the first
order condition (1.12), or equivalently from (1.16), if λ = 0, it is possible to obtain wε as
follows:
wε(x, y) = u′−1
(
[max {0, [(1− ε)µ(z = y) + εµ(z 6= y)]Ly(x)}]−1
)
,
where, because of the concavity of u, the function u′−1 : [0,∞] → [w,∞] is decreasing
with u′−1(∞) = w. Therefore, the following holds:
E (wε |G) =
∫
wε(x,G)fG(x, 1)dx =
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u′−1
(
[max {0, [(1− ε)µ(G) + εµ(B)]LG(x)}]−1
)
fG(x, 1)dx =∫
u′−1
(
[max {0, [(1− ε)µ(G) + εµ(B)]LB(x−G)}]−1
)
fB(x−G, 1)dx =∫
u′−1
(
[max {0, [(1− ε)µ(G) + εµ(B)]LB(x)}]−1
)
fB(x, 1)dx >∫
u′−1
(
[max {0, [(1− ε)µ(B) + εµ(G)]LB(x)}]−1
)
fB(x, 1)dx =∫
wε(x,B)fB(x, 1)dx = E (wε |B) ,
where, in particular, the inequality follows from µ(G) > µ(B) and the monotonicity of
the function u′−1. This completes the proof. 
Proposition 1 states that the simple benchmarking rule obtained in (1.6) does not
hold in the present context and, therefore, observable luck is not necessarily removed
from managerial compensation. This result follows because the optimal contract inducing
unconditional effort adjusts explicit incentives to implicit incentives. After the bad signal
z = B, implicit incentives are stronger so that explicit incentives can be weaker and this is
achieved by reducing the pay-for-performance sensitivity in state y = B. Similarly, after
the good signal z = G, the pay-for-performance sensitivity in state y = G has to increase
in order to make up for the weaker discipline brought about by bankruptcy. As a result, if
the net performance, i.e. performance net of the contribution of luck, is above the critical
level γ2 , compensation in state y = G is higher than the level required to eliminate the
effect of luck, given in condition (1.6) in the previous section. From the other hand, net
performances below the same threshold lead to compensation levels in bad times that
are above what is required by the same rule (1.6. For this reason it is not possible to
predict in general how expected wages rank in the two states y = B, G. In fact, E(wε |G)
is increased by compensation levels corresponding to net performances above γ2 but it is
decreased by compensations associated to performances below γ2 . The opposite happens
to E(wε |B). However, proposition 1 also shows that if the agent extract some rents from
the contract, he also receives a higher expected wage in the good state. In fact, when
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the individual rationality constraint is not binding (i.e. λ = 0), net performances below
the critical level γ2 receive a constant wage so that only the distortion corresponding
to net performances above γ2 are relevant and this points unambiguously toward higher
compensation in good times. Finally, notice that the condition λ = 0 is sufficient but
not necessary for the result as shown by the numerical examples contained in section 4.
The following result provides an additional characterization of the optimal contract that
makes it explicit the use of asymmetric benchmarking.
Proposition 2 For each ε ∈ [0, 12)the unique minimum cost contract wε implement-
ing (aB , aG) = (1, 1) pays more in the good state if the performance is good and it pays
more in the bad state if the performance is bad. More precisely, there exists a performance
threshold x̂(ε) > G+ γ2 such that:
(1) if x > x̂(ε), then wε(x,G) > wε(x,B);
(2) if x < x̂(ε), then wε(x,G) ≤ wε(x,B).
Proof For a given ε, define x̂(ε) as the solution to:
[(1− ε)µ(G) + εµ(B)]LG(x) = [(1− ε)µ(B) + εµ(G)]LB(x)
that, after rearranging terms, can be written as:
H(x, ε) ≡ µ(B) [LG(x)− LB(x)] + [µ(G)− µ(B)] {LG(x)− ε [LG(x) + LB(x)]} = 0.
(1.17)
Notice that H is a continuous and strictly increasing function of x and furthermore
H(xG, ε) < 0 and limx→∞H(x, ε) = [µ(G)− µ(B)] (1− 2ε) > 0.10 This implies that
x̂(ε) exists and it is unique and, furthermore, x̂(ε) > xG = G + γ2 . Let's show now that
such quantity has the properties claimed in the proposition. To this end notice that for
x > x̂(ε), Ly(x) > 0 for both y ∈ {B,G} so that condition (1.16) determines the optimal
10 To see this just check that for x→∞, both Ly(x) converge to 1 and remember that ε < 12
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wage wε(x, y). Furthermore, for any such x it results that:
[(1− ε)µ(G) + εµ(B)]LG(x) > [(1− ε)µ(B) + εµ(G)]LB(x)
immediately implying that wε(x,G) < wε(x,B), that is point (1) in the proposition. As
for point (2) just notice that it is an implication of proposition 1 for any x < xG while
for x ∈ (xG, x̂(ε)) an argument similar to the one used to establish point (1) applies. 
This second proposition reveals that optimal contracting does not simply lead to a
failure to filter out aggregate risk. It also requires that above the performance threshold
x̂(ε) compensation be increasing in the benchmark, i.e., for any given x > x̂(ε) the
manager receives a higher compensation if favorable aggregate conditions are observed
while, for x < x̂(ε) the compensation is higher in bad states. The proof of both results
relies on the same intuitive idea that can be grasped referring to figure 2 which displays
how the possibility of observing a signal on the future aggregate state distorts the wage
schedule that would be optimal in the absence of the signal. If the agent receives some
private information before choosing his action, the incentive he needs to choose high
effort is sharper in case of good news because liquidation is perceived to be less likely
and therefore is less effective as an incentive device. The way to provide the agent with
sharper incentives after the observation of good news is to make the schedule w(x,G)
steeper, thus increasing his exposure to risk. The reason is that, after observing the
signal z = G it is relatively more likely that the future state will be y = G and then
the relevant wage schedule is likely to be w(x,G). Similarly, the observation of z = B
weakens the incentive constraint that must be met to induce high effort, and lead to a
flatter compensation schedule w(x,B). It can be noticed in figure 2 that the overall result
is then the form of asymmetric benchmarking described in proposition 1 and 2.
Let EW εy =
∫
wε(x, y)fy(x, 1)dx be the expected wage payment in state y when the
available signal is affected by a noise term ε and define the ex ante expected compensation
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cost as EW ε =
∑
y p(y)EW
ε
y . The next result shows that the availability of a more precise
private signal for the agent makes it more costly to induce unconditional high effort.
Proposition 3 If for each ε ∈ [0, 12) the principal offers in equilibrium the minimum
cost contract implementing (aB , aG) = (1, 1), then the agent expected wage EW ε is a
decreasing function of ε.
Proof The proof relies on the simple observation that the availability of a more
informative signal shrinks the set of incentive compatible wage schedules. Define the
following quantity:
∆y =
∫ ∞
0
[u(xy + v, y)− u(xy − v, y)] g(v)dv.
With this notation the IC constraint corresponding to signal z can be written as follows:
p(G | z)∆G + p(B | z)∆B + [b(0 | z)− b(1 | z)]β ≥ c.
The quantity ∆y can be seen as an index measuring the pay-for-performance sensitivity in
state y. For example, if the wage payments w(x, y) above w were linear in x, the quantity
∆y would be increasing in its slope. Using this notation it is possible to see that each
IC constraint defines a hemiplane in the space (∆G, ∆B). Furthermore, straightforward
calculations show how increasing the signal precision, i.e. decreasing ε, shrinks the inter-
section of the two hemiplanes defining the region corresponding to incentive compatible
contracts. 
Endogenous independence between managerial productivity and the aggregate state
also arises when the principal implements (aB , aG) = (0, 0). In this case a constant wage
equal to U + b0B, i.e., high enough to meet the agent's participation constraint, would
be optimal.11
11 Notice however that if B > c
b0(B)−b1(B) , it is impossible to induce the agent to choose a = 1 if
he observes the private signal z = B.
Chapter 1. Paying for Observable Luck 28
1.3.2. Informed Agent Exerting Conditional Effort
An endogenous correlation between managerial productivity and the aggregate state
emerges when the principal implements either (aB , aG) = (0, 1) or (aB , aG) = (1, 0). The
first conditional effort profile produces a positive correlation while the second a negative
one. Notice that if the agent adopts the first profile his productivity in the good state
is larger because he exerts high effort only after the observation z = G which, for any
ε ∈ [0, 12) , is more likely when the future state of the world is y = G.12 Similarly, if the
agent adopts (aB , aG) = (1, 0) and the signal is not completely noisy, the agent will choose
a = 1more often in state y = B than in state y = G then producing a negative correlation.
The following proposition describes the characteristics of the optimal benchmarking rule
corresponding to the minimum cost contract implementing (aB , aG) = (0, 1).
Proposition 4 Given ε ∈ [0, 12) , if β < cb(0 |B)−b(1 |B) , the unique minimum cost
contract w01(x, y) implementing (aB , aG) = (0, 1) is a continuous function of x. Further-
more, if the incentive compatibility constraint corresponding to signal z = B is slack, it
results that:
(1) if x > γ2 , then w
01(x+G,G) > w01(x,B);
(2) if x < γ2 , then w
01(x+G,G) ≤ w01(x,B).
Proof If the agent adopts the (conditional or unconditional) effort profile (aB , aG),
the outcome pdf in state y is:
fy [x, (aB , aG)] = [(1− ε)fy(x, az=y) + εfy(x, az 6=y)] .
12 Notice that for ε = 1
2
, even the adoption of a conditional action profiles would not induce any
correlation between the aggregate state and the managerial product. In fact, with a completely noisy
signal, both (aB , aG) = (0, 1) and (aB , aG) = (1, 0) are equivalent to the behavioral strategy of playing
either level of effort with probability one half.
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Define the corresponding likelihood ratio as L(aB ,aG)y (x) =
fy(x,1)−fy(x,0)
fy[x,(aB ,aG)]
. The ex ante13
probability of bankruptcy is:
b(aB ,aG) =
∑
y
p(y) [(1− ε)Fy(x, az=y) + εFy(x, az 6=y)] ,
and the ex ante probability of exerting high effort is:14
q(aB , aG) =
∑
y
p(y) [(1− ε)I(az=y = 1) + εI(az 6=y = 1)] .
It is now possible to state the problem characterizing the minimum cost contract imple-
menting (aB , aG) = (0, 1):
min
u(x,y)≥u
∑
y
p(y)
∫
h [u(x, y)])fy [x, (0, 1)] dx (1.18)
subject to ∑
y
p(y)
∫
u(x, y)fy [x, (0, 1)] dx ≥ U + q(0, 1)c+ b(0,1)β (1.19)
∑
y
p(y |B)
∫
u(x, y) [fy(x, 1)− fy(x, 0)] dx+ [b(0 |B)− b(1 |B)]β ≤ c (1.20)
∑
y
p(y |G)
∫
u(x, y) [fy(x, 1)− fy(x, 0)] dx+ [b(0 |G)− b(1 |G)]β ≥ c. (1.21)
The problem stated in terms of utility levels u(x, y) is a convex program which admits a
unique solution u01. Let λ be the multiplier for the IR constraint (1.19) while µ(B)ρ(B)
and µ(G)ρ(G) are multipliers for IC constraints (1.20) and, respectively, (1.21). The
optimal utility schedule u01 satisfies now the following conditions:
h′
[
u01(x,G)
]
= λ+ [(1− ε)µ(G)− εµ(B)]L(0,1)G (x) (1.22)
13 Ex ante here means before the observation of the private signal.
14 In what follows the function I(A) denotes the indicator function of an event A, and its value is
one if A is true and zero otherwise.
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h′
[
u01(x,B)
]
= λ+ [εµ(G)− (1− ε)µ(B)]L(0,1)B (x) (1.23)
for all pairs (x,G) and (x,B) for which (1.22) and, respectively, (1.23) have a solution
above u, otherwise u(x, y) = u. Because L(0,1)y (x) is a continuous function, it is immediate
to check that u01 is continuous too. Furthermore, if we assume that µ(B) = 0, it must
be µ(G) > 0 and first order conditions (1.22), (1.23) can be rewritten as follows:
h′
[
u01(x,G)
]
= λ+ µ(G)
[
1− fG(x, 0)
fG [x, (0, 1)]
]
(1.24)
h′
[
u01(x,B)
]
= λ+ µ(G)
[
1− fB(x, 0)
fB [x, (0, 1)]
]
. (1.25)
Notice that fG(x+G, 0) = fB(x, 0) and for x > γ2 also fG [x+G, (0, 1)] < fB [x, (0, 1)] .
Furthermore, the solution is characterized by (1.24), (1.25) and it results:
h′
[
u01(x+G,G)
]
= λ+ µ(G)
[
1− fG(x, 0)
fG [x, (0, 1)]
]
>
λ+ µ(G)
[
1− fB(x, 0)
fB [x, (0, 1)]
]
= h′
[
u01(x,B)
]
which is equivalent to w01(x+G,G) > w01(x,B) as claimed in point (1) of the proposition.
Point (2) follows from a similar argument. 
The intuition behind this first result is that if the agent's private signal is not com-
pletely noisy, in order to induce high effort after the observation of z = G but not after
z = B, the wage schedule has to be steeper in state y = G than in state y = B.15 The
asymmetry in the benchmarking rule described in proposition 4 is then a consequence of
this characteristic. Notice that if β ≥ cb(0 |B)−b(1 |B) it would not be possible to implement
(aB , aG) = (0, 1) because in this case the liquidation cost β is so large that the manager
would choose high effort after z = B even if his wage were completely independent of
the firm's outcome. Notice that points (1) and (2) in the previous proposition have been
shown under the hypothesis that the incentive constraint corresponding to signal z = B
15 If the signal is perfectly informative, the optimal wage schedule in state y = B is constant.
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is not binding. This condition for example holds when the private signal is perfectly
informative. In fact, if ε = 0 first order conditions (1.22), (1.23) implies that µ(B) = 0,16
therefore leading to a constant wage in state B.
The next result describes the characteristics of the optimal benchmarking rule corre-
sponding to the minimum cost contract implementing (aB , aG) = (1, 0).
Proposition 5 Given ε ∈ [0, 12) , if β < cb(0 |G)−b(1 |G) , the unique minimum cost
contract w10(x, y) implementing (aB , aG) = (1, 0) is a continuous function of x. Further-
more, if the incentive compatibility constraint corresponding to signal z = G is slack, it
results that:
(1) if x > γ2 , then w
10(x+G,G) < w10(x,B);
(2) if x < γ2 , then w
10(x+G,G) ≥ w10(x,B).
The proof closely resembles the argument given for proposition 4 and is then omit-
ted. The intuition here is similar to the previous one. If the principal wants to induce
(aB , aG) = (1, 0) and the agent's signal brings some information on the future state, the
wage schedule has to be steeper in state y = B than in state y = G. Then, the kind of
asymmetric benchmarking described in proposition 5 turns out to be optimal. Again, if
β ≥ cb(0 |G)−b(1 |G) , it would be impossible to prevent the agent from choosing a = 1 after
the signal z = G, and then also after z = B. However, the assumption that β < cb(0)−b(1)
maintained throughout, implies that β < cb(0 |G)−b(1 |G) .
Proposition 4 and 5 resemble the main results in Celentani and Loveira (2006). They
found that if the agent productivity is larger in the good state, in order to induce high
effort, optimal payments must be increasing in the benchmark for large outcome real-
izations and decreasing in the benchmark for small outcome realizations. Proposition 4
contains a similar result for the optimal contract that induces the agent to adopt the
conditional effort profile (0, 1) that, in turns, produces a positive correlation between
the aggregate shock and the managerial product. Notice, however, that in Celentani
and Loveira (2006) the assumption over the managerial productivity leads to an optimal
16 Otherwise the wage schedule w(x,B) would be decreasing in x and this cannot be optimal.
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contract displaying asymmetric benchmarking, while in proposition 4 it is the contract
that is designed to induce such positive correlation. In other words, in Celentani and
Loveira (2006) the positive correlation creates asymmetric benchmarking while here the
opposite happens: to induce positive correlation, i.e. the conditional effort profiles (0, 1),
asymmetric benchmarking is needed. Notice also that in order to produce the desired
correlation between managerial product and aggregate shock, the contract has to satisfy
a larger number of incentive constraints (there are three possible deviations instead of
one). Finally notice that at the same time that the contract is creating the desired positive
correlation, it is also ruling out independence (i.e. the unconditional effort profiles) and
the opposite negative correlation, i.e., the conditional effort profile (1, 0). Similar remarks
apply to proposition 5. Celentani and Loveira (2006) show that if the agent productivity
and the aggregate state are negatively correlated, optimal payments are increasing in
the benchmark for small outcome realization and decreasing in the benchmark for large
realizations. Proposition 5 shows that one needs a contract with similar characteristics
to create this negative correlation and to rule out other possible statistical relationships
between the managerial productivity and the aggregate state.
Results contained in proposition 1 and 2 goes one step further in this direction. They
show that, even if the optimal contract is designed to produce independence between
aggregate shock and agent's productivity, wage payments can display asymmetric bench-
marking. This happens because the optimal contract has to rule out possible correlations
that could emerge when the agent observes a private signal on the strength of his indirect
incentives.
1.4. Numerical Examples
This section contains numerical examples highlighting most of the findings of the
paper. Consider an agent with a CRRA Bernoulli utility of the form u(w) = w
1−r
1−r and
the following parameter values: r = 0.7, w = 0, reservation wage W = 1 (corresponding
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to a reservation utility U = 3.3), p(G) = 0.6, γ = 100, G = 300, σ = 150, x = 0,
B = 2.5, c = 1.5. If the agent does not observe a private signal on the future state of
the world, bankruptcy probabilities are b(0) = 0.21 and b(1) = 0.10. The minimum cost
contract inducing high effort has an expected wage EW = 5.54 with a standard deviation
σW = 3.06. Inducing high effort, the principal obtains profits equal to 283.24, while
inducing low effort obtains 176.13. Figure 3 shows the optimal wage schedules in both
the good and bad state. Notice that, the horizontal difference between the two schedules
is exactly 300.
Consider now the case in which the agent can observe a private signal on the future
state of the world up to a noise term ε = 0.2. The conditional bankruptcy probabilities
are then : b(0 |G) = 0.09, b(1 |G) = 0.04, b(0 |B) = 0.37, b(1 |B) = 0.18.
Table 1: Optimal Contract Inducing (1,1)
Expected Wage Standard Deviation
EW 5.67 sigmaw 3.39
EWG 6.12 sigmawG 3.97
EWB 5.03 sigmawB 2.12
Table 1 shows wage expectations and standard deviations in both the good and bad
state of the minimum cost contract implementing (aB , aG) = (1, 1). The principal obtains
profits equal to 283.11. Notice in particular that the ex ante expected wage is larger with
respect to the case in which the agent does not observe a private signal. Furthermore,
when the agent has private information, his expected wage is larger in the good state
than in the bad state. As in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), managerial pay is then
positively affected by the observable shock. Notice also that the wage volatility is higher in
the good state because the manager has to receive a sharper incentive in this case. Figure
4 shows the optimal wage schedule implementing high effort after both realizations of the
private signal. Notice that above the threshold xˆ(0.2)≈455 the wage payment is larger
in the good state than in the bad state. Notice also that outcomes above xˆ(0.2) have
a 40% of probability in the good state but only a 1% of probability in the bad state.
Furthermore, for outcomes below the threshold xˆ(0.2), the wage payment is larger in the
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bad state. Therefore, the figure describes a situation in which the optimal wage displays
asymmetric benchmarking.
Table 2: Optimal Contract Inducing (0,1)
Expected Wage Standard Deviation
EW 4.64 sigmaw 3.61
EWG 5.26 sigmawG 4.37
EWB 3.71 sigmawB 1.56
Table 2 shows wage expectations and standard deviations corresponding to the mini-
mum cost contract implementing (aB , aG) = (0, 1). With this contract profits are equal
to 252.26. Notice that the ex ante expected wage is smaller with respect to previous cases
because the agent is induced to provide effort only after the observation of signal z = G.
For the same reason the expected outcome is smaller too and, given other parameter
values, profits decrease. Notice that the expected wage payment is both larger and more
volatile in state y = G. This is because the aggregate state G is relatively more likely
after the observation of signal z = G, which is the signal that triggers high effort. Figure
5 shows the optimal wage schedule implementing the conditional effort profile (0, 1). In
this example, the incentive constraint corresponding to the observation of signal z = B is
not binding. Therefore, we observe the situation described in proposition 4. In particular,
notice that for large outcome realizations (success), good luck is not completely removed,
i.e. w(x,G) > w(x − δ,B). In other examples it is possible to obtain a wage structure
that induces larger payments in the good state for outcomes above a certain threshold.
Table 3: Optimal Contract Inducing (1,0)
Expected Wage Standard Deviation
EW 3.96 sigmaw 2.19
EWG 3.72 sigmawG 1.38
EWB 4.32 sigmawB 2.94
Table 3 shows wage expectations and standard deviations generated by the minimum
cost contract implementing (aB , aG) = (1, 0). Corresponding profits are equal to 232.61.
The expected wage is even smaller than for the contract implementing (0, 1). This is
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because high effort here is induced after the observation of signal z = B that sharpens
indirect incentives. Notice that wage expectation and volatility are both larger in state
B. Figure 6 shows the optimal wage schedule implementing the conditional effort profile
(1, 0). The incentive constraint corresponding to signalG is not binding so that proposition
5 applies. Notice in particular that payments are increasing in the benchmark for small
outcome realizations while they are decreasing for large outcome realizations.
Finally, notice that the contract inducing the unconditional effort profile (1, 1) maxi-
mizes profits in this example and, therefore, it would be adopted by the principal.
1.5. Conclusion
The model presented in this paper describes a mechanism that explains how an optimal
contractual arrangement between a principal and an agent could display asymmetric
benchmarking even if managerial productivity and aggregate shocks are uncorrelated.
There are two key elements behind this result. First, the manager has implicit incentives
deriving from the possibility of bankruptcy and, second, after signing the contract but
before choosing his action, he observes a private signal on the future state of the world.
The signal affects managerial indirect incentives: the observation of bad news increases
the conditional probability of bankruptcy in case of misbehavior and therefore reduces
the conflict of interest with the principal. The availability of the private signal also allows
the agent to adopt conditional or unconditional effort profiles. Therefore it introduces the
possibility of observing some correlation between managerial product and aggregate state,
even if the exogenous productivity of managerial high effort is constant across states. The
optimal benchmarking rule is used not only to filter out the observable shock but also to
adjust the contractual explicit incentives to the variable implicit incentives. As a result,
even when the managerial productivity and the observable shocks are uncorrelated, the
optimal contract can display the kind of asymmetric benchmarking observed in the data.
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The focus of the paper is on managerial incentives but, because the model adopted is
very simple, it could readily be applied in different contexts where RPE considerations
are important. For example, the recognition that apparently suboptimal practices, like
asymmetric benchmarking, can indeed correspond to the most desirable arrangement
may be important for the analysis of yardstick competition (Shleifer 1985, Sobel 1999).
Regulated firms can in fact be induced to efficiently reduce their costs by setting up
incentive schemes that relies on relative performances. The findings in this paper are
then of some interest to asses the most desirable form of such incentives structures.
In this model, optimal contracts are usually non linear in the outcome. An interesting
possibility would be to restrict to contracts with a base salary and a call option on the
firm's stock. As in Aseff and Santos (2005) one could obtain the optimal contract within
this class and evaluate how it performs relative to the optimal non linear contract. This
modification of the model would also allow to study how the strike price of the optimal
option plan is affected by the observable shock.
As a final remark notice that results in this paper rely on the interplay between explicit
and implicit incentives. One could obtain similar results considering other sources of
indirect incentives as long as they are sharper in bad states of the world. For example,
negative aggregate shocks reducing the value of the firm, could increase the probability
of a takeover or could trigger a closer monitoring activity by large stakeholders. In both
cases managers would have stronger implicit incentives in bad states and optimal contracts
should not overlook their effects.
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Figure 3: Minimum cost contract implementing high effort with no signal
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Figure 4: Minimum cost contract implementing (1,1)
Outcome
W
ag
e
Outcome pdf in state B  →
← Outcome pdf in state G
← Wage in state G
Wage in state B →
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
x 10-3
-500 0 500 1000
0
5
10
15
20
Figure 5: Minimum cost contract implementing (0,1)
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Chapter 2
Career Concerns and Competitive Pressure
In a duopoly model I study the effects of increased competitive pressure in the product
market on managerial career concerns. In an early stage of their careers, managers have
unknown ability and, with no further information, they look identical to firms. Later on,
managers' observed performances, allow firms to learn about their ability and to rank
them accordingly. Good managers (i.e. managers with good past performances) are both
valuable and in short supply, so that firms are forced to compete for their hiring. In
ideal conditions, good managers are able to capture their entire value, that coincides
with the expected profits they produce in excess with respect to less talented managers.
Competition in the product market affects such profit differential and, therefore, it also
determines the strength of managerial career concerns. However, the effect of increased
competition is ambiguous: it raises the reputational concerns to the extent that it makes
to hire a good manager more valuable.
Keywords: career concerns, product market competition.
JEL classification: D43, D83, G30
Chapter 2. Career Concerns and Competitive Pressure 45
2.1. Introduction
The idea that firms should be run in the owner's interest is usually accepted so that in
modern public corporations, where property and management are commonly separated,
a problem arises of providing managers with the right incentives to implement the share-
holders' value. Most of the corporate governance literature addresses exactly this agency
problem and describes a number of possible solutions to it. In their comprehensive survey,
Becht et al. (2003) identify five mechanisms currently used to discipline managers: the
presence of a large shareholder, the market for corporate control, the board of directors,
executive compensation packages and, finally, the managers' loyalty duty coupled with
an effective shareholder legal protection.1 Even if in the last twenty years a large body of
both empirical and theoretical analysis has emerged, the real functioning and effectiveness
of these governance mechanisms are not well understood yet.
At least since Smith (1776), competition in the product market has been considered
as a further source of managerial discipline. The basic idea goes as follows: in firms that
operate under a strong competitive pressure, any lack of efficiency reduces profits and
seriously threaten the survival possibility in the market. Therefore, managers concerned
with the very conservation of their job, work as hard as they can to ensure profit maxi-
mization. As intuitive as it may appear at first, a closer consideration of this idea rises at
least two questions. First: what does a "more competitive market" exactly mean? Sec-
ond: which mechanisms create a link between the degree of product market competition
and managerial behavior? A part from its intuitive incentive effect due to bankruptcy,
competition may also interact with other sources of managerial incentives. For example,
Hart (1983), Scharfstein (1988), Hermalin (1993) and Schmidt (1997), among others,
analyze how the characteristics of the product market affect the optimal compensation
package to be offered to managers, and competition has been assumed to either affects
1 Another very well known survey of corporate governance is by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). Here
the authors suggest that the essential elements of a successful governance system are some form of
concentrated ownership and legal protection of investors. There is a number of other general treatment
of the issue. For example Tirole (2001) tries to analyze the role of the so called stakeholder society while
Zingales (1998) frames the corporate governance problem in an incomplete contract approach.
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the information structure behind the optimal contract (Hart 1983, Scharfstein 1988), or
firms profitability and the incentive to give incentives (Hermalin 1993, Schmidt 1997).
The contribution of this paper is to analyze how product market competition, through
its effect on firms profitability, affects managerial career concerns.2 The basic idea is that,
at least for managers at the top of the firm's ladder, like the CEO or the CFO for example,
career concerns mainly depends on the external labor market, that is, on alternative job
opportunities in other firms. From the other hand, firms' willingness to pay for managerial
talent depends on its profitability which, in turns, is determined by the characteristics
of the product market. In this way, the level of product market competition affects
managerial behavior through its effect on the strength of career concerns.
The model has two periods and in each period two firms compete in the product
market. Firms have to hire managers before each round of product market competition,
and they can only commit to pay a fixed wage. Hence, no explicit contractual incentives
are allowed. Managerial ability and effort determine the firm efficiency and competitive
strength on the product market and, therefore, its profits. In the first period managerial
skills are symmetrically unknown to everybody, and effort is not observable by firms. All
the managers have the same, commonly known, priors over their ability so that they are
homogeneous from the firms' point of view. Because of this homogeneity, young managers
have a very weak bargaining position in the labor market, here represented as a sequential
game where firms offer a wage to each manager and then managers choose one of them (if
any). Such labor market structure allows firms to hire young managers at the reservation
wage. In period two, however, the observation of past performances allows firms to make
some inferences about managerial skills. The manager who performed the best is now
more valuable, and obtains a wage premium on the labor market equal to the extra profits
that he is able to produce with respect to the other manager. This extra profit is referred
2 Fama (1980) first proposed the idea that career concerns can be an important source of incentives
in large corporation. In his original view, the agency problem created by the separation of ownership and
control is completely resolved by the managerial incentives to build a good reputation. Later on, even if
Holmstrom (1999) recognized that career concerns are in general suboptimal, a large body of literature
as emerged, and managers are usually believed to derive powerful incentives from their careers. (For
example, see Murphy, 1999, or Becht et al., 2003).
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to as the value of efficiency in this paper, and it plays a fundamental role in determining
the strength of career concerns. In fact, a central result of the analysis is that a change in
the product market that rises the marginal value of efficiency, also increases managerial
effort. The basic insight for this result is that the manager with the best past performance
is more valuable, and firms are willing to pay more to hire him. In the ideal labor market
described above, firms compete a là Bertrand for the best manager, so that the wage
premium that they are forced to pay coincides with the amount of profits that he is
expected to produce in excess to the other manager. Therefore, it is exactly such profit
differential that determines how strong career concerns are, and it may either increase or
decrease in a more competitive product market.
There are several papers in the literature that study the incentive effects of product
market competition. However, they usually assume that managers sign a formal contract
that makes their compensation contingent on some measure of the firm efficiency (cost
reductions, accounting profits, etc.). Because optimal compensation packages depend
on the competitiveness of the environment, the degree of competition indirectly affects
managerial incentives. In the model by Hart (1983) the principal observes a cost in-
dex which depends on both an industry wide shock and the managerial effort. A more
competitive product market then allows the principal to make better inferences about
the agent's contribution. With a very special assumption on the agent preferences, Hart
shows that agents work harder in more competitive markets. Scharfstein (1988) however
shows that this conclusion is not robust to alternative specifications on the managerial
utility function.
In a different vein, Hermalin (1993) and Schmidt (1997) assume that increased com-
petition reduces firms profitability. In both cases smaller profits have an ambiguous effect
on optimal contracts and managerial effort levels. A mechanism that induce ambiguity in
both models is what Schmidt calls the value-of-a-cost-reduction effect and Hermalin calls
the change-in-the-relative-value-of-actions effect. To grasp the general idea consider a sit-
uation in which the efficiency of a firm can be either high or low and let piH and piL be the
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corresponding profits in the two cases. Of course piH > piL. More competition decreases
both piH and piL, but what is really relevant is how competition affects the difference
piH − piL. Intuitively, piH − piL measures the loss associated with a lack of efficiency, and
the higher it is, the larger the equilibrium effort induced by optimal contracts. Because
competition can either increase or decrease piH − piL, its incentive effect is ambiguous.3
As discussed above, in this paper I show that a similar (ambiguous) effect also holds when
managers have career concerns as their main source of incentives.
A different approach is taken by Willig (1987). Still retaining the usual principal-agent
framework, he identifies increased competition in the product market with a smaller and
more elastic (residual) demand function. From his analysis emerges that a smaller demand
tends to reduce efficiency, while increased elasticity raises it. Again, the overall effect is
ambiguous.
A common characteristic of the literature discussed so far, is that the strategic interac-
tion among firms operating in an imperfectly competitive product market is ignored and
the market structure is then assumed to be exogenous. An exception is Raith (2003): he
explicitly analyzes a market game among firms run by managers rewarded in accordance
to the cost reduction they induce. He shows that more substitutable products or a larger
market size induce managers to provide more effort while a reduction in the entry cost
reduces managerial effort. To some extent his results are still ambiguous: smaller entry
cost or larger substitutability could both be regarded as increased competition but they
have opposite effects on the equilibrium effort.4
The effect of competition on career concerns has received very little attention in the
literature. An important exception is Vickers (1995). He suggests that the most basic
characteristic of competition is the very existence of competitors, and, at least, it allows
firms to evaluate their performance relative to that of other firms. In the case of career
3 Schmidt also identifies a bankruptcy effect that unambiguously rises managerial effort: in a more
competitive market the probability of bankruptcy is higher, and managers tend to work harder to keep
their job. Contrary to Schmidt (1997), Hermalin (1993) allows for managerial risk aversion in his model,
and, as a consequence, he finds that increased competition also has an income effect and a risk adjustment
effect, both with an ambiguous sign.
4 A remarkable property of his model is that changes in any parameter value result in a positive
correlation between the pay-for-performance sensitivity and the profit volatility.
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concerns, the performance of a competitor represents a further source of information that
can be used to learn something about the unknown managerial ability. Of course, this
form of relative performance evaluation is relevant only if there exists some correlation
among agents' abilities in the market, and its effect depends on the sign of such correlation.
In particular, if managerial abilities are positively correlated, then the observation of a
good industry result is the signal that each manager's ability is indeed high, so that, in
this case, future managerial wages are increasing in the market performance. Managers
would therefore like to free ride on other firms' good performances, and incentives are
in fact reduced in this case. The opposite happens if managerial abilities are negatively
correlated.5 However, in this paper I assume that unobservable managerial abilities are
independently distributed so that I completely abstract from the learning effects suggested
by Vickers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces the basic
model and characterizes the equilibrium effort. It is then argued that the main determi-
nant of career concerns is the value of efficiency. Therefore, the impact of a change in
the market environment on indirect incentives passes through its effect on the value of
an efficient manager. In section three I consider some examples of explicit market games
and, using the results previously obtained, I am able to evaluate how parameter values
affect incentives. To conclude, section four contains some final remarks.
5 Vickers also shows that the overall effect on the ex-ante incentives to provide effort depends crucially
on the correlation of the measurement errors affecting individual performances: if there is a large positive
correlation, incentives to provide effort are increased, the intuition being that if this correlation is strong
the precision in observing managerial ability is higher and then any given level of effort has a higher
impact on the learning process.
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2.2. Career Concerns within a Duopoly
2.2.1. The Basic Model
There are two periods t = 1, 2 and in each period two firms compete in the product
market. Each firm is made by a principal (the owner) and an agent (the manager) who
has to be hired at the beginning of each period t with a constant salary wt.6 Contingent
payments are not allowed and long term binding contracts cannot be signed. There are
two managers to be hired whose innate ability, or skill, is symmetrically unknown at
the beginning of period one. To make things simpler I assume that each manager has a
reservation salary w which is independent of his age and past experience. The competitive
strength of a firm is summarized by an efficiency parameter x whose value is affected by
the managerial skill and activity. More precisely firm hiring manager i in period t has in
that period an efficiency parameter:
xi,t = ηi + ei,t + εi,t (2.1)
where ηi is manager i's innate ability (or skill or talent), ei,t ∈ [0, e] is his effort in period t,
and εi,t is an idiosyncratic random component. The manager's ability and effort are then
substitutes in rising such an efficiency parameter and then the firm strength in the product
market. Such x -value can be thought of as some measure of what Leibenstein (1966) called
X -efficiency, as opposed to allocative efficiency. The X -efficiency of a firm is typically
determined by those cost reducing activities (plant restructuring, waste reductions, work
methods and so on) that are directly under the managerial control. In period one ηi ∼
N(0, σ2η) while εi,t ∼ N(0, σ2ε) for any manager and any period. All random variables are
independent. In what follows I identify a generic manager with the superscript i, while
superscript j denotes the other one, finally superscript n denotes a generic firm.
6 In the following the firm owner will be referred to as a female and the manager as a male.
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The timing of events in period one is as follows: 1) Managerial abilities are determined
independently according to a N(0, σ2η), and no one observes them; 2) Firms bid to hire a
manager; 3) Both managers decide how much effort to exert, and efficiency parameters
are determined and publicly observed; 4) Firms compete in the product market. In period
two events from 2) to 4) take place anew. Agents are assumed to be risk neutral and
their utility is simply w1 +w2 − g(e1)− g(e2), where g(e) is the cost of exerting effort e.
The function g is twice continuously differentiable strictly increasing and strictly convex,
furthermore g(0) = g′(0) = 0 and lime→e− g′(e) = ∞. Firms maximize total expected
profits.
In order to fully describe the extensive form game to be analyzed, it is necessary to
specify how the bidding phase in point 2 is realized. I assume that both firms simulta-
neously submit a wage offer to each manager. Then, in period 1 an equal probability
lottery decides which of the two managers has to make the choice between the offers he
faces, if any, while the other manager will not be able to accept the offer received by the
firm that closed its vacancy. In period two, if both managers worked in the first period,
the manager who previously performed the best has the advantage of being the first to
make a decision. Notice that observing exactly the same managerial efficiency in the first
period is a zero probability event, and it induces a subgame in which managers are still
identical, in such a case the rules of the first period are still applied. If a manager is not
assumed by any firm in the first period, he will exit the industry so that he will not be
on the labor market in the second period. His lifetime utility in this case is then 2w.
I consider these particular bidding rules to capture two relevant characteristics of the
managerial labor market. First, in the market for young and inexperienced managers,
firms have the strongest contractual position: the point here is that young managers
are very close substitute to one another, for example because their past careers are not
very informative about their talent as CEO in that particular industry, so that they
compete very closely and firms can finally extract almost all the surplus generated by
the relationship (in fact all the surplus in the model). Second, a senior manager with
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a good past performance is a "scarce good" in the managerial labor market and then
he has a stronger bargaining position allowing him to obtain part of the surplus. The
model captures this feature with the rule that assigns to the good manager the priority
in choosing between the firm offers.
For the purposes of this paper it is better not to consider an explicit market game. I
will rather describe the firms interaction in the product market by means of a (reduced
form) profit function. In particular if xt = (x1,t, x2,t) are the realized efficiency parameters
in period t, for firm 1 and 2 respectively, product market competition yields to the firm
hiring manager i at time t the amount of profits:
pii,t = pi(φ, xi,t, xj,t), (2.2)
where the function pi : Φ× R2 → R is bounded both above and below, it is increasing in
xi,t and decreasing in xj,t (monotonicity properties being strict in at least one argument)
and, furthermore, it is twice continuously differentiable. The parameter φ belongs to
some open interval Φ ⊂ R, and will be used to index the degree of competition in the
product market with the interpretation that a higher φ corresponds to a more competitive
environment.
Notice that with the assumptions made on the function pi, a higher efficiency parameter
corresponds to higher profits for the firm who realizes it, and to lower profits for its
competitor. Then a larger efficiency parameter corresponds to a stronger firm in the
market. Also notice that firms are in a substantial symmetric position in the market:
only realized efficiency parameters determine profits and not their particular distribution
among firms. This formalization, then, is not descriptive of those circumstances in which
some firms have other sources of market power, as for example it would be the case if one
of the firms were a Stackelberg leader, or had an information advantage over the demand
structure, etc.7 In principle, a firm could be run without a manager, that would be the
7 However, the formulation could easily allow for changing market conditions between period one
and two: it would be enough to have different profit functions in the two periods. To add this possibility
wouldn't change anything in the analysis so I prefer to stay with the notation introduced in the text.
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case if some manager prefers the outside option, but I assume that the profits would then
be so low that any strategy involving wage offers below the managers' reservation value
are weakly dominated and are suboptimal whenever the probability of hiring nobody is
positive. More precisely, I assume that if a firm doesn't hire a manager its profits are
pi(φ) < infx,y pi(φ, x, y)−w, while a firm managed with efficiency x and facing a competitor
with no manager obtains profits equal to pi(φ, x) = supy pi(φ, x, y).
How the degree of product market competition (here indexed with the parameter φ)
affects the amount of profits that can be earned is not very clear in general terms. For
example, Boone (2002, 2004) analyzes several examples of oligopoly markets where the
strength of competition is naturally identified with the value of some parameter.8 He
finds that as competition increases, the amount of profits earned by the least efficient
firm decreases, but he also finds that the ratio between the profits of any firm and those
of a less efficient one increases. With identical firms this result simply means that in-
creased competition decreases profits for every firm. However, when firms with different
efficiencies coexist in the market, the result suggests the traditional selection effect of
competition already described for example in Vickers (1985).9 Since the main focus of
this paper is on the relationship between the strength of career concerns and product
market competition, I'll rather consider the following two alternative conditions that, as
it will be shown thereafter, play a crucial role.
Condition 1 (IVE) For each (x, y) the difference pi2(φ, x, y)−pi3(φ, y, x) is strictly
increasing in φ.
Condition 2 (DVE) For each (x, y) the difference pi2(φ, x, y)−pi3(φ, y, x) is strictly
decreasing in φ.
8 He considers three different sources of increased competition: a larger number of firms, more
aggressive market interactions and more efficient competitors.
9 Boone also finds that some quantities commonly used to empirically asses the degree of competition
in an industry (e. g. the Herfindhal index, price cost margins, etc.) are not monotonic in the level of
competition as measured by the relevant parameter. He then proposes a new empirical measure based
on profit ratios.
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To interpret these VE (marginal Value of Efficiency) conditions, let's consider the
difference pi(φ, x, y)−pi(φ, y, x). It represents the profits differential that a firm of efficiency
x can produce when it competes with a firm of efficiency y. Such differential has of
course the sign of x− y and depends on the product market degree of competition. The
derivative pi2(φ, x, y)− pi3(φ, y, x) represents then the marginal value of efficiency x, and
condition IVE (Increasing VE) requires it to be increasing in the value of competition,
while condition DVE (Decreasing VE) requires it to be decreasing in φ. According to
IVE, then, to be more efficient is more important in a more competitive environment.10
The opposite is true according to DVE. None of these conditions is to be intended an
exact characterization of how the strength of competition in the product market affects
firm profitability. The idea of imperfect competition is indeed a vague one. It refers to the
existence of some kind of rivalry among firms that strategically interact in the product
market, but the exact nature of such rivalry, as well as its intensity and consequences,
have to be better specified in any particular context. Broadly speaking, competition
has both an exogenous and an endogenous component: there are characteristics in the
product market such as entry fees, size, substitutability among different brands of the
same product, transparency, the eventual threat of a potential entrant etc, that naturally
affect the strength of the firm competition within an industry. These elements are, to a
large extent, exogenous and in this model I exactly refer to these kind of determinants
of the market competitiveness. However, the number of firms in any particular industry
as well as their respective market shares are important determinants of the degree of
competition and, of course, they are endogenous. I will not attempt to consider this
other aspect of competition in this paper. In principle, the exogenous characteristics
of a markets determines its endogenous structure so that changes in the first can affect
the second and the overall effect will be the sum of the two. Hence, it is incomplete to
analyze only the effects of exogenous elements but this is a first step toward a better
10 Note that for each (x, y) the difference |pi(φ, x, y)− pi(φ, y, x)| measures the value of the most
efficient manager and condition IVE implies that such quantity is strictly increasing in φ. This latter
condition closely resembles the selection effect of increased competition found by Boone in his examples,
but it is here expressed in terms of differences in profits rather than profits ratios.
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understanding of the whole process. Of course, changes in the exogenous structure that
do not affect the number of firms find here a complete treatment.
2.2.2. Equilibrium Analysis
The concept of equilibrium that will be used is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium,
which will be simply referred to as the equilibrium. A pure strategy for a firm specifies
in each period a wage offer for each manager on he labor market as a function of the
observed history of the game.11 A pure strategy for a manager has to specify in each
period which offer to accept (if any) and the level of effort to exert in case he is hired
by a firm as a function of the past observed history of the game. I will only consider
pure strategy equilibria. Players also have beliefs about managerial talents. In period
one everybody shares the same priors described above. The (possible) observation of
the first period efficiency parameters then allows to update such beliefs in period two.
The process of belief revision taking place after he observation of first period efficiency
parameters depends on the amount of effort that i is expected to exert in period one, say
êi,1. Given (2.1) and given such expectation, the observation of xi,1 is equivalent to the
observation of:
zi,1 = ηi + εi,1 = xi,1 − êi,1.
A simple process of normal learning then then takes place and the updated beliefs about
manager i's ability is ηi/xi,1 ∼ N(τzi,1, τσ2ε), where τ = σ
2
η
σ2η+σ
2
ε
is the signal to noise ratio.
Note that manager i could choose in principle ei,1 6= êi,1 so distorting the market learning
process about his talent. In such a case, from manager i's standpoint, it would result that
ηi/xi,1 ∼ N(τ(zi,1 + ei,1 − êi,1), τσ2ε) which first order stochastic dominates the previous
one as long as ei,1 > êi,1. However, in equilibrium firms have rational expectation in the
sense that they correctly anticipate the level of effort chosen by the managers.
11 Hence, if a manager doesn't work in period one he won't be on the labor market in period two so
that, after any such history, firms cannot make any wage offer to such manager.
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Given êi,1 and êj,1, if both managers are hired in period one, the firm hiring manager
i has first period expected profits, gross of wage payments, given by:
Πi,1 = E(ε1,η) [pi(φ, ηi + êi,1 + εi,1, ηj + êj,1 + εj,1)] ,
while if only manager i is hired in period one his principal first period expected gross
profits are:
Πi,1 = E(ε1,η) [p¯i(φ, ηi + êi,1 + εi,1)] ,
where the expectation above are evaluated at the beginning of period one and take into
account the prior distribution of the random variable η = (ηi, ηj).
It is immediate to recognize that in period two a hired manager has no incentive to
provide a positive level of effort, that is ei,2 = ej,2 = 0. Hence, if both managers are
rehired in period two, the firm hiring manager i has expected second period gross profits
given by:
Πi,2 = E(ε2,η) [pi(φ, ηi + εi,2, ηj + εj,2) |x1] .
From the other hand, if only manager i is rehired in period two, his principal has expected
second period profits, gross of wage payments, given by:
Π¯i,2 = E(ε2,η) [p¯i(φ, ηi + εi,2) |xi,1] ,
where these second period expectations are evaluated at the beginning of period two,
using the distribution of η resulting after the observation of x1.
In period two, after the observation of first period efficiencies, managers are no longer
homogeneous in terms of their talent, even if they are both expected to exert no effort.
Furthermore, firms compete à la Bertrand to hire the most skilled of them, so that they
will end up paying out to the good manager a wage premium that completely exhausts
the profit differential he is able to produce in the product market. This intuition is shown
in the following two lemmas.
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Lemma 1 In any equilibrium firms earn the same amount of expected net profits in
each subgame starting at the beginning of period two.
Proof There are three different types of subgames starting at the beginning of
period two. First, in subgames following histories where no manager was hired in the
first period both firms obtain pi(φ) with probability one. Second, in subgames following
histories where exactly one manager was hired in the first period, say manager i, at least
one principal won't be able to hire a manager in period two and her profits will be pi(φ).
Let Π¯i,2 −wi,2 be the expected profits of the other principal when she hires the manager
with a salary wi,2 ≥ w¯(note that in equilibrium it is not possible that the manager turns
out to be unemployed in period two). If wi,2 >Π¯i,2−pi(φ) the principal hiring the manager
would prefer not to hire him and if wi,2 <Π¯i,2−pi(φ) the principal hiring no manager could
make a wage offer wi,2 + ε that for ε ∈
(
0, Π¯i,2 − pi(φ)
)
attracts the manager and allow
the deviating firm to increase its profits. Hence, it must be wi,2 =Π¯i,2 − pi(φ). Finally,
in subgames following histories where both managers were hired in the first period, they
are rehired in the following period in any equilibrium. Hence, let wi,2 and wj,2 be their
salaries in period two, it must be shown that:
Πi,2 − wi,2 = Πj,2 − wj,2.
Assume by contradiction that Πi,2 − wi,2 > Πj,2 − wj,2, i. e. it is more profitable to hire
manager i. There must be at least one principal hiring manager j with positive probability
and she could attract manager i with probability one by offering him a slighter higher
wage, say wi,2 + ε (with ε > 0) and withdrawing at the same time the wage offered to
manager j, such a deviation is convenient for each ε < 12 [(Πi,2 − wi,2)− (Πj,2 − wj,2)] .
A similar contradiction arises from the alternative assumption Πi,2 − wi,2 < Πj,2 − wj,2
and this completes the proof. 
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium both managers are hired in both periods. Furthermore,
the wage earned by manager i in period one is independent of ei,1 while the wage he earns
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in period two is given by: 12
wi,2 = w¯ + (Πi,2 −Πj,2) I (xi,2 ≥ xj,2) .
Proof Let's show first that both managers are employed in period one. If, by
contradiction, manager i doesn't work in the first period, his lifetime utility is 2w¯ and
at least one firm is earning pi(φ) in the same period. Lemma 1 then implies that such a
principal will not be able to earn more than pi(φ) in period two either, so that to offer
w¯ + ε to manager i in period one is a profitable deviation for each ε ∈ (0,Πi,1 − pi(φ)),
because she attracts manager iwith such an offer and obtain strictly larger expected net
profits. Hence, both managers are hired in the first period and this immediately implies
that they are both hired also in period two. To obtain the expression of wi,2 consider
first the situation in which xi,1 < xj,1. Let's show that in this case wi,2 = w¯. Assume
by contradiction that wi,2 > w¯ (note that it cannot be wi,2 < w¯ in any equilibrium) and
consider the following alternative bid for the principal hiring manager i: the offer made
to manager i is slightly reduced while the other is kept constant. With such a strategy
she will still end up hiring manager i but at a smaller wage and then she has an incentive
to deviate. Similarly, if xi,1 > xj,1 then wj,2 = w¯. Note also that if xi,1 = xj,1, then
Πi,2 = Πj,2, so that it must be wi,2 = wj,2 = w¯ since there's no need for a firm to offer
more in order to hire one of the two perfectly identical managers. Together with lemma 1
and the fact the both managers always work in a firm, this last result immediately implies
the expression given for wi,2. To complete the proof it remains to show that wi,1 doesn't
depend on ei,1 but this is trivially true since firms cannot observe effort levels (however
the wage offers in the first period do depend on êi,1 and êj,1). 
Lemma 2 makes it clear that there are two reasons for a manager to build a career
through the exertion of some positive level of effort in the first period. First of all, a
manager can earn more than the reservation wage only if he performs better than the
12 Thereafter I'll use the notation I(E)to denote the indicator function of an event E, that is,
I(E) = 1 if E is true and I(E) = 0 otherwise.
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other one and, second, the wage premium that the best manager obtains, increases with
his perceived ability.
Also notice that the lemma suggests the existence of what could be called an implicit,
lagged relative performance evaluation: the wage earned by a manager in period two
depends on his relative performance in period one, and this is not an explicit contractual
agreement but simply a consequence of the firm equilibrium behavior in the model.13
The fact that in this model the best manager completely appropriates the extra profits
he is able to produce may seem quite extreme. In a more realistic model firms would retain
part of such profits but, what is really at stake here is how the competitiveness of the
firms' product market shapes the managerial incentives to build a career. The previous
lemma, then, simply suggests that such incentives depend on how profitable to hire a
good manager is, which in turn depends on the characteristics of the product market. It
seems reasonable to expect that in markets where firms profitability is not strongly linked
to their X-efficiency, the incentives for managers to build a career are probably not very
high. To make this point more explicit, consider the following quantities:
zi,1 = ηi + εi,1 ∼ N
(
0, σ2η + σ
2
ε
)
;
zi,2 = ηi + εi,2 ∼ N
(
τ (zi,1 + ei,1 − êi,1) , (1 + τ)σ2ε
)
;
zj,1 = ηj + εj,1 ∼ N
(
0, σ2η + σ
2
ε
)
;
zj,2 = ηj + εj,2 ∼ N
(
τzj,1, (1 + τ)σ2ε
)
.
Their interpretation is as follows: zi,1 and zj,1 are simply the sum of the unknown talent
and the noise term in the first period for manager i and, respectively, manager j. Notice
in particular that the distributions of such quantities are those commonly held at the
beginning of period one, and they are independent of the managerial choice of effort.
From the other hand the quantity zi,2 represents manager i's ability plus the second period
13 When managers are given contingent compensation contracts, the use of relative performance
evaluation allows to reduce the managerial exposure to risk, and, therefore, the cost of incentive provision.
However, in this model managers receive a fixed wage payment in each period, and the use of relative
performance evaluation emerges for a completely different reason.
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noise, and its distribution is conditioned on the first period information (here summarized
by zi,1) in the hypothesis that manager i exerts effort ei,1 while he is expected to exert
effort êi,1. The quantity zj,2 has a similar meaning for manager j but its distribution is
computed assuming that his effort choice is correctly anticipated (and is equal to êj,1).
Hence, increasing the effort he provides, manager i can bias firms' learning process making
the distribution over his ability in period two better, in the sense of first order stochastic
dominance. Of course, in equilibrium the manager will not fool the market.
In terms of the notation just defined, manager i is paid above his reservation wage in
period two if and only if zi,1 > zj,1 + êi,1 − ei,1, furthermore, the wage premium that she
obtains in such an event can be written as follows:
wp (φ, zi,1 + ei,1 − êi,1, zj,1) = E(zi,2,zj,2) [pi (φ, zi,2, zj,2)− pi (φ, zj,2, zi,2)] .
Notice that this quantity is twice continuously differentiable. At the beginning of period
one manager i's expected wage in period two can then be written as follows:
w (φ, ei,1 − êi,1) = w¯ + E(zi,1,zj,1) [wp (φ, zi,1 + ei,1 − êi,1, zj,1) I (zi,1 + ei,1 − êi,1 > zj,1)] =
w¯ +
∫∞
−∞
∫∞
v+êi,1−ei,1 wp (φ, u+ ei,1 − êi,1, v) dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v).
The above quantity, which is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing in ei,1,
can be used to characterize the equilibrium effort exerted in the first period. This is done
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In any equilibrium the two managers choose in the first period the
same level of effort e1(φ) which is uniquely identified by the condition:
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
v
wp2(φ, u, v)dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v) = g
′ (e1(φ)) . (2.3)
Proof As a preliminary step, let's show that for each (φ, u, v) ∈ Φ×R2, the quantity
wp2 is indeed strictly positive. Consider a given (φ, u, v) ∈ Φ×R2, and define the random
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variables x ∼ N (τu, (1 + τ)σ2ε) and y ∼ N (τv, (1 + τ)σ2ε) . It is therefore possible to
write:
wp (φ, u, v) = E(x,y) [pi (φ, x, y)− pi (φ, y, x)] ,
where the difference pi (φ, x, y)− pi (φ, y, x) is strictly increasing in x. Since a larger value
for u induces a strictly dominant distribution on x (in the sense of first order stochastic
dominance), it result that wp2 (φ, u, v) > 0. This property of wp2 is important: it ensures
that the left hand side of (2.4), measuring the marginal value of effort for manager i, is
indeed strictly positive, so that (2.4) has in fact a unique solution. Let's now show that
condition (2.4) effectively identifies the optimal effort level for both managers in period
one. To do so, notice that the level of effort exerted by manager i in period one can
only affect his expected wage in period two, hence, in equilibrium, his choice solves the
following problem:
max
ei,1∈[0,e¯]
w (φ, ei,1 − êi,1)− g (ei,1) .
The solution e∗ (êi1) exists and maps [0, e¯] into itself. Furthermore, such solution must be
interior and, therefore, it is identified by the first order condition w′ (φ, e∗ (êi1)− êi,1) =
g′ (e∗ (êi1)). Furthermore, the equilibrium effort chosen by manager i must be correctly
anticipated by the firm, i. e. it must be a fixed point of the function e∗ (e). When the
objective function in the above maximization problem is not quasi concave, such fixed
point, call it ei,1(φ), may not exist, and it would therefore not be possible to obtain
an equilibrium in pure strategy. However, when such fixed point does exist, it is the
unique solution to the equation w′ (φ, 0) = g′ (ei,1(φ)) which, taking into account that
wp(φ, v, v) = 0 for each φ and v, can be written as follows:
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
v
wp2(φ, u, v)dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v) = g
′ (ei,1(φ)) . (2.4)
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Notice also that the equilibrium effort level chosen by manager j is similarly characterized
by: ∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
v
wp2(φ, u, v)dFzj,1(u)dFzi,1(v) = g
′ (ej,1(φ)) . (2.5)
Since the random variables zi,1 and zj,1 are identically distributed, conditions (2.4) and
(2.5) both coincides with condition (2.3). This shows the statement in the proposition. 
Notice that, in equilibrium, firms correctly anticipate the managerial effort in the first
period, so that, in equilibrium, it does not affect the expected wage that a manager will
earn in period two. In fact, such quantity can be computed as follows:
w∗ = w(φ, 0) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
v
wp(φ, u, v)dFzj,1(u)dFzi,1(v). (2.6)
The above proposition characterizes the effort level that managers choose in equilibrium
in the first period. Such effort is a proxy for X-efficiency within the industry, and it
depends on the level of competition in the product market. Therefore, implicitly differ-
entiating expression (2.3) with respect to φ it is possible to evaluate how competition
affects managerial incentives to build a career:
e′1 (φ) =
∫∞
−∞
∫∞
v
wp12(φ, u, v)dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v)
g′′ (e′1 (φ))
. (2.7)
The following proposition establishes some comparative statics results.
Proposition 2 If condition IVE is satisfied, then e′1(φ) > 0, while if condition DVE
is satisfied, then e′1(φ) < 0.
Proof The proposition immediately follows from the property that, for each (φ, u, v) ∈
Φ × R2, if condition IVE is satisfied, then wp12 (φ, u, v) > 0, while, if condition DVE is
satisfied, then wp12 (φ, u, v) < 0. To show this property, consider a given (φ, u, v) ∈ Φ×R2,
and define the random variables x ∼ N (τu, (1 + τ)σ2ε) and y ∼ N (τv, (1 + τ)σ2ε).
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Therefore, it is possible to write:
wp1 (φ, u, v) = E(x,y) [pi1 (φ, x, y)− pi1 (φ, y, x)] .
The difference pi1 (φ, x, y)−pi1 (φ, y, x) is strictly increasing in x if condition IVE is satisfied
and it is strictly decreasing in x if condition DVE is satisfied. Since a larger value for
u induces a strictly dominant distribution on x (in the sense of first order stochastic
dominance), the sign of wp12 is as claimed above. 
Notice that VE conditions are sufficient but by no means necessary for the result in
the above proposition. In particular situations, weaker versions of them could suffice. For
example, consider the following weak version of the VE conditions:
Condition 3 (IVE-W) For each (x, y) with x > y the difference pi2(φ, x, y) −
pi3(φ, y, x) is strictly increasing in φ.
Condition 4 (DVE-W) For each (x, y) with x > y the difference pi2(φ, x, y) −
pi3(φ, y, x) is strictly decreasing in φ.
In other terms conditions IVE-W requires that the derivative pi1 (φ, x, y)− pi2 (φ, y, x)
be increasing in x in the hemiplane x > y only. Similarly, condition DVE-W requires that
pi1 (φ, x, y) − pi2 (φ, y, x) be decreasing in x only for x > y. The following proposition 3
states that under the weaker version of the VE conditions, the same result as in proposition
1 holds, provided that in period two the residual uncertainty on the managerial talent is
small enough.
Proposition 3 If condition IVE-W is satisfied, then it exists σ+ > 0 such that σ2 <
σ+ ⇒ e′1(φ) > 0. Similarly, if condition DVE-W is satisfied, then it exists σ− > 0such
that σ2 < σ
− ⇒ e′1(φ) < 0.
Proof I only show the first statement in the proposition, the second one is similar.
Let's proceed in two steps.
Step 1 I first show that, if σ2 = 0 and condition IVE-W is satisfied then it results
e′1(φ) > 0. Given an expectation ê1 on the first period effort, the observation of xi1
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perfectly reveals the efficiency of manager i which is ηi = xi1 − ê1. By choosing a
different level of effort, say ei,1, manager i could induce the market to believe him of
talent ηi + ei,1 − ê1 and then the expected second period wage for manager i can be
written as follows:
w(ei,1 − ê1) = w+∫∞
−∞
∫∞
v+ê1−ei,1 pi (φ, u+ ei,1 − ê1, v)− pi (φ, v, u+ ei,1 − ê1) dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v).
Thus, the first period equilibrium effort e1(φ) is characterized by:
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
v
[pi(φ, u, v)− pi(φ, v, u)] dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v) = g′ (e1(φ)) ,
from which, implicitly differentiating, one obtains:
e′1 (φ) =
∫∞
−∞
∫∞
v
[pi12(φ, u, v)− pi13(φ, v, u)] dFzi,1(u)dFzj,1(v)
g′′ (e′1 (φ))
. (2.8)
so that the claim in step 1 immediately follows from condition IVE-W.
Step 2 To complete the proof, consider the numerator of the right side of 2.7 and
note that it is a continuous function of the parameter σ2ε , converging to the numerator of
the right side of 2.8 as σ2ε → 0+. 
According to both propositions 2 and 3, what is really relevant for managerial career
concerns is the marginal value of efficiency. A change in the market conditions that
increases the marginal value of an efficient manager also increases the incentives to build
a good reputation. This is so in this model because in the second period labor market, the
good manager fully appropriates of the value of his (possibly) larger efficiency, measured
by the difference in profits that he is able to produce. This result closely resembles
proposition 4 in Schmidt (1997). A major difference consists in the source of managerial
incentives: in this paper they indirectly arises from career concerns, while Schmidt uses
explicit contingent contract in his model.
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More competitive product markets are usually thought of as inducing smaller profits
(e.g. smaller price-cost margins) to the firms. However, contrary to the model of Schmidt
(1997) and Hermalin (1992), the amount of profits doesn't play any role in the present
context. This wouldn't be so if managers were not assumed to be risk neutral. With more
general managerial preferences, an income effect and a risk adjustment effect similar to
those described by Hermalin (1992) would arise both with ambiguous sign. An explicit
possibility of bankruptcy, with an associated turnover cost for the failing manager, would
also create a scope for for the amount of profits to the extent that, as it seems reasonable,
smaller profits rises the probability of bankruptcy. As in Schmidt (1997), an increased
probability of bankruptcy would naturally rises the managerial incentives in the first
period.
In this model, the bargaining power that managers with a good reputation acquires on
the labor market has a key role: they are interested in building a career only to the extent
that they can capture the value of such reputation. Any element that negatively affects
their bargaining power, as for example the existence of switching costs for a manager
who decides to change firm, for example in the form of lost specific human capital, would
then reduce their incentives. Note also that the results in this paper especially hold for
managers at the top level in the firm hierarchy. In fact, at lower levels career concerns are
mainly driven by the internal labor market, that is, by the possibility of getting better
employment conditions within the same firm. To evaluate how competitive pressure in the
product market affects the internal labor market of a firm and, therefore, the incentives
throughout the firm structure, would surely be an interesting issue to address, but it
would probably require a completely different model.
As a final remark, note that it is not clear in this setting whether the equilibrium level
of effort in the first period is too high or too low with respect to the efficient level. Of
course, the second period level is too low for sure but this depends on the fact that there
isn't any future after period two and then, there isn't any scope for building a career.
Efficiency here has to be defined with respect to profits, namely we could say that the
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efficient (symmetric) level of effort in period t is eFBt defined as follows:
eFBt ∈ arg max
0≤e≤e¯
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
pi (φ, u, v) + pi (φ, v, u) dFxi,t(e)(u)dFxj,t(e)(v)− 2g(e). (2.9)
The distribution of period t efficiencies xi,t(e) and xj,t(e) take into account all past infor-
mation and assume that managers provide the level of effort e. The first order necessary
condition characterizing this first best effort level is then:
∂
∂e
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
pi (φ, u, v) + pi (φ, v, u) dFxi,t(eFB)(u)dFxj,t(eFB)(v) = 2g
′(eFB). (2.10)
Comparing condition (2.10), defining the first best level of effort, with condition (2.3)
defining the equilibrium first period effort, it is not clear at all whether young managers
are overworking or shirking too much. Furthermore, in this model the discount factor is
for simplicity assumed to be one, namely that the future is as important as the present
in determining the lifetime utility of agents. More generally, however, a small enough
discount factor could induce young managers to provide an amount of effort below the
efficient level. But in a model with a finite horizon like this, it could also be the case that
the future is more important that the present, so that the discount factor could be
larger than one. A large enough discount factor could then induce managers to overwork.
2.3. Examples
In this section I discuss some examples of explicit market games. Propositions 2
and 3 directly allow to evaluate the impact of specific market parameters on managerial
incentives within the industry. In the first two examples I consider firms producing
a homogeneous good and competing à la Cournot with a linear demand, in the first
place, and then with an isoelastic demand. The third example is very common in IO
and it represents the easiest way of modeling price competition among firms producing
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differentiated products. A common feature of all the examples is that a larger market
size corresponds to stronger incentives. A more complete analysis would allow for an
endogenous market structure. This possibility is partially pursued in the first example
where the number of firms and their market shares is in fact endogenous, even if only two
of them can potentially employ a manager. As a final example I consider a switch from
Cournot to Bertrand competition as a way of representing an increased competitive level
between two firms.
2.3.1. Cournot Competition with Linear Demand
There's a continuum of mass n of entrepreneurial firms (EF), i.e. firms run directly by
their owner, and two managerial firms (MF), i.e. firms run by a manager. They compete
choosing the quantity to sell on the product market. The inverse demand function is
given by p(Q) = A−Q, where Q = qi+ qj +
∫ n
0
q(h)dh is the aggregate production, being
q(h) the "production intensity" of a generic EF h ∈ [0, n], and (qi, qj) the quantities
produced by the two MF. The parameter A > 0 measures the size of the market. Each
EF has a constant marginal cost equal to c > 0, while a MF has a marginal cost equal
to c = κ(x), where x denotes its manager efficiency and κ is a differentiable, positive and
decreasing function, bounded above by c. Assuming that the parameters always allow for
an interior solution (i.e. A > 3c), the profit function for a MF managed with efficiency x
and competing against n EF and a MF of efficiency y is:
pi(x, y) =
[
A+ nc+ κ(y)− (n+ 2)κ(x)
n+ 3
]2
.
The function pi is clearly bounded, strictly increasing in x and strictly decreasing in
y. The parameter φ could be here identified with n,A or c. Furthermore it results that:
pi(x, y)− pi(y, x) = n
2 + 4n+ 3
(n+ 3)2
[
κ2(x)− κ2(y)]+ 2A− 2nc
(n+ 3)
[κ(x)− κ(y)]
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and then it is possible to obtain:
∂
∂A [pi(x, y)− pi(y, x)] = 2[κ(y)−κ(x)]n+3
∂
∂c [pi(x, y)− pi(y, x)] = 2n[κ(y)−κ(x)]n+3
∂
∂n [pi(x, y)− pi(y, x)] = 2(n+3)2
[
κ2(y)− κ2(x)]− 2(A−3c)(n+3)2 [κ(y)− κ(x)] .
Note that the derivatives of the difference pi(x, y)−pi(y, x) with respect to A and with
respect to c are both strictly increasing functions of x so that condition IVE is satisfied
in those cases. Hence, a larger market or less efficient entrepreneurial competitors induce
larger incentives to build a career. It is also possible to compute:
∂2
∂n∂x
[pi(x, y)− pi(y, x)] = 2
(n+ 3)2
κ′(x) [2κ(x) +A− 3c]
which is for sure a negative quantity whenever A > 3c, then, since this is always the case
in any interior solution, the more EF are in the market, the smaller the implicit incentives
created by career concerns.14
To make the market structure endogenous consider the existence of a fixed entry cost
F > 0.15 Notice that since the MF are always more efficient than any EF and the profit
function is increasing in own efficiency, if an EF is in the market then the two MF are also
in the market. Restrict attention to a range of parameters that allow the entrance of at
least one EF. Let n∗ = n(A, c, F ) be the number of EF which optimally decide to enter as
a function of the other parameters; of course n∗ is increasing in A, and decreasing in both
c and F . It is now possible to evaluate the impact of A, c or F on the managerial indirect
incentives in case of endogenous market structure. A decrease in the entry cost increases
the number of EF so that indirectly reduces the managerial incentives. Usually, markets
protected by smaller entry costs are considered as more competitive, but this example
14 This result is similar to what found by Martin (1993). He considers a model of Cournot compe-
tition among firm run by a manager, and in which incentives are provided through explicit contingent
contracts. He finds that the optimal effort induced in equilibrium decreases when the number of firms
increases.
15 This entry cost has to be paid at the beginning of period one and allows to remain in the market
for two periods.
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shows that they also tend to be less efficient.16 The impact of changes in other parameters
is now ambiguous: for example, a larger market size would in principle increase incentives
but the entrance of more EF in the market tends to outweigh this effect, and the final
result cannot be predicted.
2.3.2. Cournot Competition with Isoelastic Demand
Consider a Cournot duopoly in the market for a homogeneous good whose inverse
demand function is p(Q) =
(
A
Q
)
( 1ε ), where, Q = qi + qj is the total quantity produced
by firms i and j, and ε > 1 is the constant elasticity of the demand function. Firm i
marginal cost is constant and is given by κ(x) where x denotes its manager efficiency and
κ is a differentiable, positive, bounded and decreasing function. The profit function for a
firm of efficiency x competing with a firm of efficiency y is then the following:
pi (x, y) =
A(2ε− 1)ε−1 [(1− ε)κ(x) + εκ(y)]2
εε [κ(x) + κ(y)]ε+1
;
where parameters are assumed to be such that no corner solutions arises, i.e. it is assumed
that ε < supκsupκ−inf κ .
Note that the function pi is continuous, differentiable, strictly increasing in x and
strictly decreasing in y. The parameter φ can here be identified with either A or ε. It is
immediate to compute:
pi (x, y)− pi(y, x) = A
[
(2ε− 1)
ε [κ(x) + κ(y)]
]ε
[κ(y)− κ(x)] ,
16 Raith (2004) also finds that a smaller entry cost reduces efficiency and for the same reason: the
presence of a larger number of firms tend to reduce incentives.
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which can be shown to be a strictly increasing function of x and a strictly decreasing
function of y. It is then possible to compute:
∂
∂A [pi(x, y)− pi(y, x)] =
[
(2ε−1)
ε[κ(x)+κ(y)]
]ε
[κ(y)− κ(x)] ,
∂
∂ε [pi(x, y)− pi(y, x)] = A [κ(y)− κ(x)]
[
(2ε−1)
ε[κ(x)+κ(y)]
]ε [
ln 2ε−1ε[κ(x)+κ(y)] +
1
2ε−1
]
.
The former of such derivatives is a strictly increasing function of x so that condition IVE
is satisfied, meaning that a larger market size induces managers to exert more effort.
From the other hand, the latter derivative is not monotone so that the impact of a
more elastic demand on the managerial incentives cannot be predicted unambiguously.
As in Willig (1987) a smaller market size tends to reduce managerial incentives, but an
increased demand elasticity has not a well defined effect here. The point is that for firm
i equilibrium requires:
p− ci
p
=
1
ε
qi
Q
;
so that a larger value of the elasticity parameter has not a well defined effect on profits (and
on profits differentials). In fact, the most efficient firm will be able to get a larger market
share if the demand is more elastic, but this doesn't ensure that the overall profits in-
creases. However, it is possible to note that if supκ < 1 the quantity ∂∂ε [pi(x, y)− pi(y, x)]
is the product of three positive and strictly increasing functions of x in the hemiplane
x > y so that, in this region, it is a strictly increasing function of x. Condition IVE-W
is satisfied and it is possible to conclude that, if the residual uncertainty is small enough,
an increased demand elasticity improves managerial incentives. The intuition is that in
such a case there cannot be a big difference between an efficient and an inefficient firm
(recall that κ is a positive function), so that the effect of a changing market share is not
very important and it is dominated by the direct effect on profits, which is the only one
showing up in the model by Willig.
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2.3.3. Differentiated Products
In the spirit of Hotelling (1929), consider a linear city of length 1 where consumers
are uniformly distributed with density A. Two firms are located at the opposite ends
of the city, and they sell the same good. The first firm location is at s = 0 and the
other firm is located at s = 1. Consumers' demand can be either one or zero, and v > 0
denotes their common valuation for the good. To move from their location to one of the
firm, consumers incur a transportation cost of t for unit of length. Firm hiring manager of
efficiency x has constant marginal cost κ(x), where the function κ has the same properties
as in the previous example. To fix notation, assume that manager i is hired by the firm
located at zero while the other firm is hiring manager j. Competition is in prices and, if
(pi, pj) are the prices charged by the two firms, to buy one unit of the good the consumer
located at s faces a total cost of pi + ts or of pj + t(1 − s) depending on whether he
goes to firm i or to firm j. The consumer located at s(pi, pj) = 12 +
pj−pi
2t is indifferent
between the two firms, so that those located at his left prefer to buy from firm i, and
those located to his right prefer to buy from firm j. The parameter t is traditionally
interpreted as a measure of the product substitutability: the smaller its value the closer
substitute the two products are. Competition among firms producing closer substitutes is
usually considered to be tougher so that it is quite natural to interpret a decrease in t as
an increase in competition. As above, it is also interesting to evaluate the impact of the
parameter A on managerial incentives. Assuming that v is large enough to ensure that,
in equilibrium, each consumer is willing to buy one unit of the good, the profit function
of a firm having efficiency x and competing with a firm with efficiency y is:
pi(x, y) =

A [κ(y)− κ(x)− t] if κ(x) < κ(y)− 3t
A
18t [3t+ κ(y)− κ(x)]2 if |κ(x)− κ(y)| ≤ 3t
0 if κ(x) > κ(y) + 3t.
Notice that only when |κ(x)− κ(y)| ≤ 3t both firms are producing a positive amount
of goods while in the other cases the most efficient firm only is supplying the whole
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market. If κ is decreasing then the profit function satisfies all the properties stated in
section 2 but it doesn't have partial derivatives, and then it is not differentiable, in the
region {(x, y) : |κ(x)− κ(y)| = 3t}. However, this region has measure zero in the real
plane so that all the results in the previous section still go through with the exception
of proposition 3 that requires continuity for the partial derivatives of pi. It is possible to
obtain:
∂
∂x
[pi(x, y)− pi(y, x)] = −Aκ′(x)
[
2
3
+
1
3
I (|κ(x)− κ(y)| > 3t)
]
.
The above quantity is strictly increasing in A and then a larger market size increases
the managerial incentives to build a career. However, it doesn't depend on t if the
parameter configuration only allows for an interior solution, i.e. supκ − inf κ ≤ 3t.
This corresponds to a situation in which firm efficiency doesn't make a big difference
(possible cost reductions are small compared to transportation costs). However, when
corner solutions are possible, i.e. supκ− inf κ > 3t , the above derivative is a decreasing
function of t for any (x, y). Hence, provided that firm efficiency is important enough, an
increased product substitutability makes managerial career concerns sharper.17
2.3.4. A Switch from Cournot to Bertrand Competition
An increase in competitive pressure is sometimes represented by a switch from Cournot
to Bertrand competition. In order to analyze how such a change affects the managerial
career concerns let's consider a market with linear demand P (Q) = A−Q, in which two
firms compete in prices with probability q, and in quantities with probability (1 − q).
As above, each firm has constant marginal cost equal to κ(x) where x is its managerial
efficiency and κ is a differentiable, positive and decreasing function bounded above by
some value c > 0. Of course, this is a fictitious market, but it exactly reproduces the
Bertrand game when q = 1 and the Cournot game when q = 0. Assume that parameter
17 This result seems to be robust to alternative specification of the transportation cost, as long as
it is the same for each consumer. For example, using a convex transportation cost as c(x) = tx2 or a
concave one as c(x) = t(2x− x2) exactly yields the same results.
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values are such that both firms produce a positive quantity in the Cournot competition
(i.e. A > 2 supκ− inf κ), and that in the Bertrand game the less efficient firm's marginal
cost is always below its competitor monopoly price (i.e. A > 3 supκ, note that this
condition implies the previous one). With these restrictions the profit function in case of
Cournot and Bertrand competition are respectively:
piC(x, y) =
[
A+ κ(y)− 2κ(x)
3
]2
piB(x, y) =
 [A− κ(y)] [κ(y)− κ(x)] if x ≥ y0 if x < y.
Hence the overall profit function is:
pi(x, y) = qpiB(x, y) + (1− q)piC(x, y).
It is then possible to compute:18
∂2
∂x∂q
[pi(x, y)− pi(y, x)] =
 −κ
′(x)
[
A+2κ(x)−3κ(y)
3
]
if x > y
−κ′(x)
[
A+3κ(x)−4κ(y)
3
]
if x < y.
The last quantity is strictly positive as long as A > 3 supκ, which is always the case
for the previous profit function to make sense. Therefore, the IVE condition is satisfied,
and an increase in the probability q induces managers to exert a larger effort in the first
period. In particular, this means that in a Bertrand game career concerns are sharper
then in a Cournot game, provided that the market size is large enough.
18 As in the previous example, the function pi is not differentiable everywhere. In this case pi doesn't
have partial derivatives along the line x = y but such region has measure zero in the real plane and all
the previous results, but proposition 3, still hold.
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2.4. Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the effects of product market competition on managerial career
concerns. Differently from Vickers (1995), the analysis abstracts from the existence of
any correlation among managerial abilities, and, therefore, relative performances are not
useful in the firms' learning process. However, competition among managers in the labor
market reintroduces relative performance evaluation in two ways. First, managers are
ranked according to past performances and the best receives a wage premium in the
future. Second, the future wage premium is equal to the profits that the best manager
is expected to produce in excess with respect to the competitor, and, in turns, this
expected profit differential depends itself on past relative performances (the larger the
gap in managerial performances observed in the past, the more likely that such a gap will
be large also in the future). The profit differential produced by a more efficient manager
was called the value of efficiency, and it was shown that changes in market parameters
that reduce such quantity also reduce ex-ante incentives to provide effort. I also provided
several examples showing that increased competition does not always produce stronger
career concerns.
The effect of product market competition on managerial career concerns emerges from
the interaction between two markets: the firm product market and the managerial labor
market. As such, it would be better treated in a general equilibrium framework but,
unfortunately, there isn't any satisfactory way of treating imperfect competition in general
equilibrium models. The analysis in this paper, which is framed in a partial equilibrium
context, then suffers of several limitations. For example, top executive skills are usually
of a general nature and are worth more or less the same in many different markets. It
is in fact not infrequent that the CEO of a firm in a given industry moves to some firm
in another industry. In the partial equilibrium framework used in this paper, this would
mean that the exogenous outside option for any given manager depends in fact on his
performance in the industry, but the kind of dependence would certainly be better treated
as a general equilibrium phenomenon. The model should also allow for more then two
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managers and, possibly, for overlapping generations of managers, but these extensions
shouldn't add too much to the results obtained above.
At a more general level, much remains to be understood on the interaction between
competition (in product or factor markets) and corporate governance mechanisms, but my
impression is that a reasonable treatment of strategic interactions in general equilibrium
is needed to properly address these and related issues.
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Chapter 3
Managerial Entrenchment and the Market for
CEOs
In this chapter I present a simple model of entrenchment in which CEOs' have pri-
vate benefits of control and their incentives derive from turnover in the labor market.
Managers have unknown ability which affects their past performances. The ability of suc-
cessful managers is then perceived to be high, and they obtain higher compensation while
retaining private benefits of control. Failing managers, on the contrary, reveal to be less
skilled and are fired, then losing private benefits. Entrenchment allows failing managers to
keep their job with some probability, and has two effects on the managerial labor market.
First, it prevents captured companies from seeking better managers, then reducing the
market value of a successful CEO. This demand effect weakens career concerns. Second,
it decreases the number of successful managers, then increasing their market value. This
supply effect strengthens career concerns. The model predicts that if the probability of
firing an entrenched manager is small, the demand effect dominates, so that a reduction
in the ex-ante probability of entrenchment increases managerial compensation.
Keywords: Managerial Entrenchment, Career Concerns.
JEL classification: D83, D86, G34.
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3.1. Introduction
Corporations are very common forms of business organization. Despite their diffusion,
the separation of ownership and control, typical in this kind of companies, entails a basic
agency problem between shareholders and management. Moreover, especially when stock
ownership is dispersed among many investors, agency problems are exacerbated by the
absence of a well identified principal. To control management is surely valuable, but it
has the nature of a public good: any shareholder benefits from anybody else being looking
after managers, but, trying to free ride on each other's controlling effort, shareholders may
well end up leaving managers with substantial discretion. Typically, small shareholders
consider their investment in the company as a way of diversifying their portfolio, and
they are not interested in getting involved in management.1
To overcome this problem shareholders appoint a board of directors that is supposed
to act on their behalf in controlling management. Board powers are usually defined very
broadly in the corporate charter, but the most important decisions in which boards play
a significant role are those concerning the selection, monitoring and replacement of the
CEO (see for example Mace 1971, Vancil 1987, and, more recently, Hermalin and Weis-
bach 2003). However, the CEO may have in practice a significant influence in selecting
directors, and may also serve as the chairman of the board. It is therefore not surprising
that CEOs might try to entrench themselves in their positions, filling the board with
people willing to rubber stamp any managerial decision and, at least as importantly,
unwilling to replace the CEO when it would be in the shareholders' interest to do it.
Entrenched managers are therefore hard to replace. Typically, removing them from their
position requires a hostile takeover. However, takeovers can be expensive for the raider,
who might be forced to pay a substantial premium on the firm's market value. Further-
more, managers can be protected by antitakeover provisions in the corporate charter, or
by some form of antitakeover legislation. Not surprisingly, hostile takeovers are relatively
1 Of course, they can sell out their shares if they are not satisfied with the company's performance.
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rare events.2 As a result, a board that is captured by the CEO is ineffective in protecting
the shareholders' interest.3 There are however alternative sources of discipline that can
make up for the absence of an effective board. Among these, managerial career concerns
are surely of great importance. In fact, both entrenched and non-entrenched managers
are concerned with the value that their reputation has on the market for managerial
services. Fama (1980) first proposed the idea that career concerns can completely resolve
the agency problems involved in large corporations. Holmstrom (1999) criticized this
extreme conclusion on the ground that the value of a good reputation only accrues at
some point in the future, so that, if agents are impatient, career concerns at most provides
suboptimal incentives. In some circumstances career concerns could even exacerbate an
incentive problem, as for example for fund managers (Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa
1986). A large body of literature as emerged since the original work of Fama, and, at
least for CEOs, it is generally accepted that career concerns are an important disciplining
device (Murphy 1999, Becht et. al. 2003).
This paper studies the relationship between entrenchment, managerial pay, and man-
agerial career concerns. The basic insight of the analysis is that good managers are
in short supply, so that firms compete to hire them and are willing to pay more than
the reservation wage. Managers have therefore an incentive to build a good reputation,
and this incentive is stronger when the equilibrium pay on the labor market is higher.
Entrenchment affects the characteristics of the managerial labor market and, as a con-
sequence, it also affects managerial pay and career concerns. In a nutshell, one of the
main consequences of entrenchment is that the board of directors is not willing to replace
the CEO, but this means that a captured firm will not be active on the demand side
of the managerial labor market. Therefore, entrenchment dampens competition on the
demand side of the market for CEOs. Because of this demand effect, the equilibrium wage
2 See Becht, Bolton and Roell (2003) for a general discussion of takeovers, and Jahera and Pugh
(1991) for an analysis of the antitakeover legislation in Daleware.
3 However, Almazan and Suarez (2003) argue that, in order to save on the overall managerial com-
pensation cost, some degree of managerial entrenchment could be optimal for shareholders. In a similar
vein, Adams and Ferreira (2007) argue that, taking into account the dual role of directors as both monitors
and advisors of the CEO, some degree of board friendliness can be optimal.
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tends to decrease and, as a consequence, managerial career concerns tends to be weaker.
However, entrenchment also has a supply effect that runs in the opposite direction. In
fact, entrenchment reduces the availability of good managers, then rising their market
value and making their career concerns stronger. Which of the two effects dominates
cannot be predicted in general. However, I show that if the probability of replacement of
an entrenched manager is small, for example because of a strong antitakeover legislation,
then the demand effect is the most important. In this case, reducing the number of
entrenched manager (i.e. of captured firms) increases the competition on the demand
side of the market for CEOs and, as a result, the managerial pay increases, and makes
career concerns stronger.
In the last twenty years, at least in the US, we have indeed observed a constant in-
crease in the level of managerial compensation (see for example Murphy 1999) and there
is also evidence that, over the same period, the probability of managerial entrenchment
has decreased (Huson et. al 2001). The trend in managerial compensation is uncontro-
versial and it has sometimes be interpreted as evidence of increased self dealing of CEOs
(see for example Bebchuk and Fried 2003). As for managerial entrenchment, what has
been observed is a trend toward more independent directors sitting on the board, and
the adoption of more incentive compensation for directors. Overall, boards appear to
have increased their independence from the CEO, and it is likely that the proportion
of captured board has been decreasing over time. The findings in this paper allow to
interpret the increase in managerial pay as a result of increased board independence: if
the demand effect of entrenchment is dominant a smaller proportion of captured board in
the economy should translate into increased competition for CEO hiring, and therefore
into higher wages. As mentioned above, the demand effect of entrenchment is surely
dominant when the probability of firing an entrenched manager is very low. In fact,
during the 1980s there has been a widespread adoption of antitakeover legislation in the
US, and it is likely that, entrenched managers have become more difficult to replace with
a hostile takeover.
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This paper is related to the literature on boards which is extensively reviewed by
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003). The empirical studies are predominant, and among the
most common findings are that: 1) The board composition do not affect corporate per-
formance while the board size is negatively correlated with it; 2) Both board composition
and size appear to be significantly correlated with such firm decisions as CEO replace-
ment, executive compensation, adoption of poison pills and acquisitions; 3) The board
structure evolves over time according to the evolution of the CEO bargaining power
relative to existing directors. Theoretical studies of boards are relatively more scarce. An
outstanding exception is the paper by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998). They stress that
board willingness to monitor the CEO is larger for more independent boards, but they
find that a good performing CEO strengthens his bargaining position within the board,
and is able to (endogenously) reduce its independence. In a related paper, Hermalin
(2005) elaborate the theoretical framework of his previous paper with Weisbach, and he
is able to tight together some observed trends in corporate governance. In particular,
he also proposes an argument that allows to interpret increased managerial pay as a
result of increased board independence. According to Hermalin, more independent board
are more willing to replace the CEO, and therefore he has to be payed a premium to
accept a job with an expected shorter tenure. Notice that, this argument is different from
the one proposed in this paper, and an important distinction is that Hermalin's idea is
particularly important for changes in board independence within a firm, being unchanged
the level of independence in other firms. In fact, in such a situation the firm that gets
stronger knows that the outside opportunities of potential CEOs are unchanged, and that
is exactly why it has to offer a higher compensation to attract a manager into a job with
a faster turnover. The argument that I propose in this paper relies instead on a market
effect, and it applies to changes in the probability of entrenchment that affect all the firms
in the same way (e.g. changes in the legislation on boards).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the model
and highlights the learning process taking place after the observation of first period perfor-
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mances. Section three describes the market for CEOs and characterizes its equilibrium.
In turn, section four studies the ex-ante incentive effect of job opportunities available
in the labor market, and establishes the link between managerial entrenchment and the
market for CEOs. Section five concludes.
3.2. The Model
3.2.1. Setup
There are two periods t = 1, 2. At the beginning of period 1 there is a continuum of
firms and each firm is run by an incumbent, young manager (she) receiving a fixed wage
payment normalized to zero and enjoying private benefits of control B > 0. Without loss
of generality, the mass of firms is assumed to be one. Firm n ∈ [0, 1] has an investment
opportunity that can result in a success, in which case it yields V (n) > 0, or a failure,
thus yielding zero. Let G be the cumulative distribution of investment returns in case of
success, that is, G(v) is the fraction of firms whose project returns in case of success are
at most v. I assume that G has a continuous density g and that its support is the interval[
0, V
]
. Managers differ in their ability of successfully bringing about the investment
project. Such ability, or skill, or talent, is summarized by a real number θ ∈
[
0, 1η
]
, with
η > 1, whose cumulative distribution in the population is F with continuous density f .
The specific ability of any particular manager is not known to anybody, including the
manager herself. Let θ¯ denotes its mean and σ2 its variance in the population.4 The
manager working in firm n, henceforth manager n, can get entrenched in the first period.
I model entrenchment as a binary variable: either manager n captures the firm's board
she works for, or she doesn't. Entrenched managers are harder to remove from their
4 In what follows, the capital letter Θ will be used to refer to the random variable managerial skill
while θ will refer to its specific values.
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position. The entrenchment probability depends on elements that could be collectively
referred to as corporate governance quality. Such elements could for example include
the number of independent directors sitting on the board, the existence of independent
remuneration and auditing committees, the participation and activism of institutional
investors (mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, etc.). It is clear that the
probability of entrenchment within a firm is to some extent idiosyncratic and depends
on its particular history and characteristics. However, there are also elements that are
common to everyone in the economy and that affect how likely is for a CEO to gain
control of the board. Among them, legislation plays surely a big role: it may for example
require specific characteristics of the board for a company to be incorporated or listed.
The analysis in this paper is concerned with those aspects of corporate governance which
depend on the existing legislation so that cross section variability of governance quality
will be completely disregarded. Let's define with γ ∈ (0, 1] the probability of entrenchment
within any firm in the economy. A smaller γ corresponds to a tighter corporate governance
legislation, making it harder for a manager to capture the board. In what follows, it will
also be useful to refer to the quantity λ = 1−γγ directly measuring the quality of governance
and ranging from zero (entrenchment always occurs) to∞ (entrenchment never occurs).5
If a manager does not succeed in capturing the board, she can be removed at the end of
the period while an entrenched manager secures his position (a precise description of the
consequences of entrenchment follows). Whether a manager captures the board or not is
publicly observed in the economy. Each manager n, whether she got entrenched or not,
implements the firm investment project and the probability of success p(n) depends on
5 The entrenchment probability could also depend on some form of managerial pressure to capture
the board. For example, an incumbent manager could choose an action a ∈ [0, 1] and the resulting
probability of entrenchment could be γa. Action a would represent the managerial attempt to decrease
board independence within the restrictions imposed by the legislation. For example, even if a minimum
number of independent directors must be appointed but the condition of independence is not well defined,
a manager willing to make the board more friendly could try to impose directors that are formally in a
condition of independence but that, for other reasons, are close to her. However, in the model considered
here, entrenched managers obtain a larger utility than non-entrenched ones (see in particular proposition
2). Therefore, as long as no costs are associated with any degree of entrenchment pressure, each manager
would choose a = 1. This is precisely the scenario analyzed in the text. Notice however that entrenchment
actions could be costly (for example, a CEO could try to bribe some important independent director)
but, as most of the results presented in the paper are independent of this assumption, I will not consider
this possibility.
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her ability θ(n) and effort e(n) ∈ [1, η] according to:6
p(n) = θ(n)e(n). (3.1)
Managerial effort e cannot be observed and has a utility cost c(e) > 0 satisfying c′(e) > 0,
c′′(e) > 0, c′(1) = 0, c′(η) = ∞. At the end of period one, firm n receives the realized
returns of the investment project while manager n receives B − c(e). To summarize,
the timing of events in period one is the following: 1) The ability of each manager is
determined according to F ; 2) With probability γ each manager gets entrenched, and
everyone observes the realization of this event; 3) Each manager chooses an effort level;
4) Each firm investment project produces its result which is publicly observed; 5) Agents
receive first period payoffs.
In period two each firm n has a new investment opportunity that, again, can result
in a success, thus yielding the same amount V (n) as in period one, or in a failure, thus
yielding zero. However, before implementing their projects, firms have the opportunity
to evaluate and, possibly, dismiss their incumbent manager. In particular, unsuccessful
managers who didn't capture their board are fired and they are not able to find a new job
as chief executives. Therefore, they leave the scene, thus losing their private benefits of
control, and receive their reservation wage equal to zero in some alternative occupation.
From the other hand, unsuccessful managers who did entrench themselves in the first
period are fired only with some probability α ∈ [0, 1]. If they are fired, again they
lose control benefits and obtain zero elsewhere, while, if they keep their position, they
also keep their private benefits of control, even if their wage is equal to zero in this
case. The main mechanism that allows a company to dismiss an entrenched manager
is a hostile takeover, so that α can be interpreted as the probability that a successful
raid occurs. The value of α reflects several elements that can reduce the profitability
of a hostile takeover. The free rider problem described by Grossman and Hart (1980)
6 Notice that a manager with the highest ability exerting the maximum level of effort succeeds with
certainty.
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can force a rival to pay a substantial premium on the firm's share pre-bid price. This
erodes the profit margin for the bidder and can undermine its incentives to undertake
the operation.7 Takeover legislation or anti takeover provisions in the corporate charter
may also make it costly to conduct a successful raid, and, furthermore, the price to be
paid for a successful takeover may increase if some competing bidder becomes interested
in the same target. Of course, the free rider problem, anti takeover provisions, and
bidders competition could be more or less important for different firms so that, at least
in principle, the probability of firing an entrenchment manager could vary across firms.
Again, this cross section variability is disregarded and α is assumed to measure the
strength of antitakeover legislation. Therefore, a smaller α corresponds to a stronger
legislative protection against hostile bids.
Successful (senior) managers, whether they were entrenched or not, enter a perfectly
competitive labor market where they are reallocated among independent firms. A firm is
independent in three cases: first, when it was not captured by its manager in period one,
second, when even if it was captured, its investment project was a success and, third, when
even if it was captured and failed, its manager were fired anyway.8 Put it another way,
non-independent firms, that do not participate the labor market, are firms that failed in
period one and did not fire their managers. The labor market is perfectly competitive so
that both managers and firms are price (i.e. wage) takers. At the given market wage firms
can demand at most one senior manager and, to the other side, senior managers decide
whether to offer their services or not. Senior managers willing to supply their work at the
7 Imagine that the value of a firm's share under current management is v, while it could be v′ > v
under alternative management. Let p < v′ be the price that a raider offers to buy any of the firm's share,
and consider the holder of a single share who does not believe to be pivotal in the success of the raid.
If he thinks that the raid will be successful, then he has an incentive not to tender his share (in this
way he gets v′ instead of p < v′). In other words, he has an incentive to free ride on other shareholders'
tender decision, and enjoy the full capital gain v′ − v. However, if each shareholder decides not to tender
his share, the takeover cannot be successful. Hence, to have some chances to succeed, the raider must
pay at least a price p = v′ but, in this way, he's paying to shareholders the entire capital gain, and the
incentives to buy the firm are completely destroyed.
8 In the second case, the board of directors has no reason to fire the manager so that the fact that
she is entrenched is immaterial. Notice that, firing decisions are embedded in the structure of the model
instead of being explicitly analyzed. However, their explicit consideration wouldn't alter any result: it
would clearly be optimal to fire a failing manager whenever possible. It is therefore for the sake of
simplicity that I use the reduced-form model described in the text.
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given market wage are allocated among firms willing to hire one of them, giving priority
to more productive firms, i.e. firms whose project returns are higher in case of success.
If a firm does not hire a senior manager on the market it will hire a young one with
unknown ability distributed according to F . Young managers receive their reservation
wage that, as in period one, is normalized to zero. Furthermore, if a senior manager
does not find a job in a firm, she leaves the market, loses private benefits of control and
receives in some alternative occupation her reservation wage equal to zero. After having
been hired by a firm, neither senior nor young managers exert any productive effort so
that the probability of success of their investment project equals their unknown ability.9
At the end of period two, each firm receives the realized returns of the investment project,
managers who found a job enjoy private benefits of control B and, among them, senior
manager receive the market wage. Finally, all remaining managers receive a wage equal to
zero. To summarize, the timing of events in period two is the following: 1) Unsuccessful
managers are fired with probability one if they are not entrenched and with probability
α if they are entrenched; 2) Independent firms and senior successful managers enter the
labor market; 3) Managers do not exert any productive effort; 4) Each firm investment
project produces its result which is publicly observed; 5) Agents receive second period
payoffs.
There is no discounting so that agents maximize total expected payoffs. Notice that
firms are heterogeneous in terms of investment returns in case of success and, at least
in principle, this heterogeneity could reflect underlying differences in either the firm size
or the firm productivity. However, private benefits of control extracted by managers in
bigger firms are likely to be higher, while they are constant and equal to B in the model. It
therefore appears more natural to think of firms as being roughly the same size (measured
for example by the employment level) but having available projects of different quality.10
9 This is so because there are no returns on effort in period two: compensation within the period is
fixed and there is not a future to justify further concerns to build, or keep, a good reputation.
10 Notice that managers also have private benefits of shirking that can be extracted by exerting a
low level of effort. In fact, the cost of effort c(e) could be thought of as the amount of such private
benefits that a manager of ability θ has to give up to induce a probability of success equal to θe.
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In this setup a pure strategy for manager n specifies productive efforts [e(n), eE(n)]
to be exerted in case of no entrenchment and entrenchment respectively, and also a rule
to decide whether to supply her labor services in the second period labor market, in case
she succeeded in period one, as a function of the market wage. A pure strategy for firm
n specifies a rule to decide whether to demand or not a successful manager at the given
market wage, in case it participates as an independent firm to the second period labor
market.
3.2.2. Learning the Managerial Ability
At the beginning of period one, every agent believes that the ability of manager n
is distributed according to F. However, the observation of first period investment results
allow to update such beliefs. In particular, if manager n is expected to exert efforts ê(n),
the posterior cumulative distribution F̂ of her ability in case of success is:
F̂ (θ) =
∫ θ
θ
ê(n)uf(u)du∫ 1
2
θ
ê(n)uf(u)du
=
E(Θ |Θ ≤ θ)
E(Θ)
F (θ) (3.2)
which dominates the unconditional distribution F (in the sense of first order stochastic
dominance) and, furthermore, is independent of ê(n). It is also independent of n so
that each successful manager's ability is believed to be distributed according to F̂ . Let
f̂(θ) = θf(θ)/θ¯ be the corresponding density and θ̂ the corresponding mean. Because of
first order stochastic dominance, it clearly results θ̂ > θ¯. In fact, it is a matter of simple
algebra to obtain:
θ̂ = θ¯ +
σ2
θ¯
. (3.3)
Notice that the higher the volatility of managerial ability, the larger the improvement on
managerial expected skill in case of success. If the uncertainty about θ is big, i.e. σ2 is
large, success is interpreted as a more reliable signal of managerial high skill. Conversely,
if almost all the probability mass is concentrated around θ¯ in period one, i.e. σ2 is small,
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even in case of success managerial skills will not be considered to be significantly above
the average.
The learning process described above takes into account that entrenchment is observ-
able. However, as it is clear from (3.2) the quantity ê(n) does not affect posterior beliefs
and, therefore, unobservability of the entrenchment history would not change anything
in the present context. Of course, this is a consequence of the particular firm technology
described in (3.1). With more general technologies the assumption of entrenchment un-
observability would be necessary to prevent the entrenchment history from affecting the
learning process. However, even maintaining such assumption, more general technologies
would make the learning process depending on anticipated effort levels [ê(n), êE(n)]. In
particular, the higher ê(n) or êE(n), the worst the posterior distribution of the ability of
a successful manager. Intuitively, the more effort managers are expected to put into their
job, the less informative their possible success is about their true skills. This possibility
would not necessarily break the relevance of symmetric learning processes (i.e. learning
processes that do not depend on n) as, in equilibrium, anticipated effort levels equal the
actual managerial effort choices that can be symmetric (i.e. the same for every manager).
However, a consequence would be that the larger the equilibrium effort, the smaller the
value of a successful manager, the smaller their wage in the second period labor market.
However, in section 3 I will discuss another reason that introduce a similar relationship
between equilibrium effort and second period market wage: higher equilibrium effort
levels enlarge the set of successful managers in period two, and strengthen competition
among them. As a result, they earn smaller wages in the labor market. Hence, more
general technologies do not introduce any new effect in the model. It is therefore for
the sake of simplicity that I use the technology described in (3.1): it makes the learning
process in case of success quite straightforward, and allows a very simple characterization
of equilibrium behavior without affecting qualitative results.
Let's also consider the learning process that takes place after the observation of a
failure in period one. Let again eˇ(n) be the expectation on the effort level exerted by
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manager n. If firm n fails the posterior distribution of her ability is:
Fˇn(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
[1− ueˇ(n)] f(u)du∫ 1
2
θ
[1− ueˇ(n)] f(u)du
=
1− eˇ(n)E(Θ |Θ ≤ θ)
1− eˇ(n)E(Θ) F (θ).
Such distribution is dominated by F for every expectation on manager n exerted effort
eˇ(n). Notice also that the corresponding density is fˇn(θ) =
1−θeˇ(n)
1−θ¯eˇ(n)f(θ), and manager n
expected skill is:
θˇn = θ¯ − eˇ(n)σ
2
1− eˇ(n)θ¯ .
Therefore, a young manager is expected to be better than a manager who failed in period
one, for any possible expectation eˇ(n) on her effort level. As a consequence, the firm
that was hiring a manager who failed has an incentive to fire her, and no other firm in
the economy has an incentive to offer her a new job as chief executive. To give a further
interpretation of α, assume for a moment that entrenched managers cannot be fired. If
firm n was captured by its manager and then failed in period one, its market value at the
beginning of period two is θˇnV (n), while it would be worth at least θ¯V (n) > θˇnV (n) if
its manager were fired. It could then be profitable for a rival to buy firm n's share, take
control of the company and then fire the incumbent manager to look for a replacement
in the labor market.11 Such a takeover would clearly be hostile because the incumbent
manager has an incentive to resist and retain her position to keep enjoying private benefits
of control. As a consequence, all failing firms not announcing their willingness to replace
their manager becomes potential targets for a hostile tender offer bid. Therefore, the
probability α that an entrenched and failing manager is fired is a simple way of modeling
the existence of potential raiders: if manager n is entrenched and fails, with probability
α she suffers a hostile takeover and is fired, while firm n participates to the managerial
labor market. If firm n is not taken over, its entrenched manager cannot be removed and
will keep her position within the firm.
11 In fact, if a raider buys 100% of the target's shares at θˇnV (n), removes the board and fires the
incumbent manager, the market value of the company increases at least to θ¯V (n). Therefore, the raider
obtains a capital gain of at least
(
θ¯ − θˇn
)
V (n) =
eˇ(n)σ2
1−eˇ(n)θ¯V (n) > 0.
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3.3. Labor Market Equilibrium
The outside wage for a senior manager on the second period labor market is zero, but
she would lose private benefits of control in an alternative job. As a consequence, senior
managers optimally supply their services at any market wage above −B. Similarly, firm
n optimally demands a senior manager if the expected value she can generate, net of wage
payment, is not smaller than the expected value generated by a young manager. That is,
if w is the market wage, firm n optimally demands a senior manager whenever:
θ̂V (n)− w ≥ θ¯V (n),
which is equivalent to:
w ≤ σ
2
θ¯
V (n). (3.4)
At the beginning of period two, what is relevant for the subsequent functioning of
the labor market is the set of potential buyers and the set of potential sellers. Potential
buyers are all independent firms, and potential sellers are all successful managers. Which
subsets of firms and managers are relevant in the labor market then crucially depends on
managerial behavior in the first period. In what follows I only consider the case in which
managers behave symmetrically in period one, that is, each of them chooses the same
levels of productive effort (e, eE) . I assume that a strong law of large number holds in this
model for a continuum of random variables.12 In this case, in period two the following
will happen with probability one: the set of independent firms will have a measure of
(1− γ) + γθ¯eE + γ(1− θ¯eE)α, which can also be written as 1− γ(1− α)(1− θeE). With
probability one, the distribution of project returns among independent firms is therefore
12 Judd (1985) shows that there are some difficulties associated with such a law of large numbers
when it involves a continuum of random variables, but it is not in contradiction with basic mathematics.
In particular, he shows that it is always possible to construct a probability measure in which a continuum
of independent random draws is representable, and such that a strong version of the law of large numbers
in fact holds. However, it is also possible to construct alternative probability measures that are as
meaningful, and for which it fails. Hence, while it is perfectly admissible to assume that the probability
measure one is working with is compatible with a strong law of large numbers, this approach doesn't
allow to relate the continuum model to some limit of large but finite models. See Al-Najjar (2004) for an
attempt in this latter direction.
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1− γ(1− α)(1− θ¯eE)
]
G, and the measure of successful managers is (1 − γ)θ¯e + γθ¯eE ,
which can also be written as θ¯e− γθ¯(e− eE). An equilibrium wage w in the labor market
is then implicitly defined by:
[
1− γ(1− α)(1− θ¯eE)
] [
1−G
(
θ¯
σ2
w
)]
= θ¯e− γθ¯(e− eE). (3.5)
To interpret condition (3.5), remember that, according to (3.4), at a given wage w,
all firms whose project returns is at least θ¯σ2w, optimally demand a senior manager.
Hence at the wage w the measure of firms demanding a senior manager is exactly[
1− γ(1− α)(1− θ¯eE)
] [
1−G
(
θ¯
σ2w
)]
, so that (3.5) can be interpreted as a market
clearing condition: at w the measure of firms that demands a senior manager is equal
to the measure of senior manager, all of whom are supplying their services at any
non-negative market wage.13 Denoting with H the inverse function of G and recalling
that λ = 1−γγ , it is possible to solve (3.5) for the equilibrium wage w as a function of e
and eE :14
w(e, eE) =
σ2
θ¯
H
[
λ
(
1− θ¯e)+ α (1− θ¯eE)
λ+ θ¯eE + α
(
1− θ¯eE
) ] . (3.6)
To interpret condition (3.6), remember that successful managers are allocated to inde-
pendent firms, giving priority to more productive ones. Furthermore, the market clearing
13 More generally, Let Λ ⊂ [0, 1] be the set of independent firms, and let S ⊂ Λ be the subset of
such firms that were successful in period one. Consider sets with the following characteristics: S and
Λ(v) = {n ∈ Λ : V (n) ≤ v} are measurable for each v. Denoting with µ(A) the measure of a set of real
numbers, it is then possible to define the cumulative distribution of project returns in case of success for
firms in Λ which is given by:
GΛ(v) = µ [Λ(v)] .
An equilibrium wage w in the labor market is then defined by:
µ(Λ)−GΛ
[
θ¯
σ2
w
]
= µ(S).
Notice that, if the set S of successful managers or one of the sets Λ(v) is not measurable, then such
definition of equilibrium wage cannot be used. However, as long as both effort profiles [e(n), eE(n)] are
measurable functions with means given by e¯E and, respectively, e¯, then with probability one µ(S) =
(1 − γ)θ¯e + γθ¯eE and µ [Λ(v)] =
[
1− γ(1− α)(1− θ¯eE)
]
G(v). Notice also that if a manager deviates
unilaterally from the above profiles, the measure of the relevant sets of buyers and sellers in the second
period will not be affected. Of course, a deviation would change the probability that the firm run by the
manager and the manager herself will belong to such sets.
14 More precisely, H : [0, 1] → [V , V ] is the inverse of the restriction of G to the interval [V , V ]
where G is strictly increasing.
Chapter 3. Managerial Entrenchment and the Market for CEOs 93
wage is such that the least profitable firm hiring a senior manager breaks even. Hence, it
is exactly this marginal firm that commands the equilibrium wage, that is given exactly
by its willingness to pay. A larger set of senior managers reduces the profitability of the
breaking even firm and then the equilibrium wage in the market. Similarly, a larger set of
potential buyers increases the profitability of the marginal firm that will then command
a higher equilibrium wage. Notice that condition (3.6) defines the equilibrium wage for
given values of e and eE but, in turn, equilibrium effort levels depend also on the market
wage that a successful CEO can earn on the labor market. The overall equilibrium has
then the nature of a fixed point and is analyzed in the following section. Some remarks
are useful at this point. First, notice that the equilibrium wage is a decreasing function
of both e, eE and θ¯. This is so because the larger e, eE or θ in period one, the bigger the
set of successful manager in period two, the stronger the competition that every senior
manager receives by the group of peers. Second, the equilibrium wage is increasing in the
first period skill volatility, the reason being that the larger σ2 the bigger the expected
ability of a senior manager (see expression 3.3), the larger the wage that firms are willing
to pay for them. Third, notice that the equilibrium wage is increasing in α. In fact,
a larger probability of firing an entrenched an failing manager increases the measure of
independent firms and then boosts the equilibrium market wage. Finally, the equilibrium
wage also depends on the characteristics of the distribution of project returns in case of
success. In particular, shifting probability mass toward higher value of investment returns
would increase the equilibrium wage. To conclude this section notice that from condition
(3.5) it is clear that a reduction in the ex-ante probability of entrenchment γ (i.e. an
increase in λ) has two different effects on the equilibrium wage. First, a reduction in γ
has a demand effect : it enlarges the set of independent firms that demand a senior CEO,
and, through this channel, it tends to increase the equilibrium wage. However, a smaller γ
also has a supply effect : it affects the size of the set of successful managers. In particular,
if e > eE , the measure of successful managers increases in the economy when γ decreases
and, therefore, the supply effect tends to reduce the equilibrium wage. Which of the two
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effects is prevalent cannot be predicted in general terms. Notice that in condition (3.6)
the equilibrium wage is also expressed as a function of λ and it is simple to see that the
sign of the partial derivative ∂w∂λ is equal to the sign of :
(1− θ¯e)θ¯eE − α(1− θ¯eE)θ¯e.
Assuming that e > eE , as in fact will be established in the next section, the sign of
this last expression depends on α and on the difference e− eE . However, for α = 0, and
by continuity also for α positive small enough, the equilibrium wage is unambiguously
an increasing function of λ. The intuition is that with α = 0 entrenchment has the
strongest impact on the competition for good managers. In fact, none of the captured
firms will be active on the managerial labor market in this case and, therefore, a reduction
in the entrenchment probability, i.e. an increases in λ, strongly increases demand side
competition. As a consequence, at least in this case the equilibrium wage increases with
λ. This property holds also when the values of e and eE are endogenized, which is the
purpose of the next section.
3.4. Entrenchment: Private vs Market Benefits
Let's consider the problem of choosing optimal levels of effort [e(n), eE(n)] for a
manager n. Assuming that any other manager is choosing (e, eE) , manager n chooses
[e(n), eE(n)] to solve the following problem:
max
[e(n),eE(n)]∈[1,η]2
(1− γ){θ¯e(n) [B + w(e, eE)]− c [e(n)]}+
+γ
{
θ¯eE(n) [B + w(e, eE)] +
[
1− θ¯eE(n)
]
(1− α)B − c [eE(n)]
}
. (3.7)
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Notice that problem (3.7) has a unique interior solution with first order, necessary and
sufficient, conditions given by:
θ¯w(e, eE) + θB = c′ [e(n)] ;
θ¯w(e, eE) + αθB = c′ [eE(n)] .
Right hand sides in the above expressions, represent marginal cost of effort for non-entrenched
and, respectively, entrenched managers, while, left hand sides represent marginal values.
Therefore, it is clear that the marginal value of effort is higher for non-entrenched man-
agers. In fact, effort increases both the probability of gaining a higher wage and the
probability of keeping private benefits of control. Entrenched managers are less con-
cerned with the possibility of being fired and, therefore, job conservation is a less effective
incentive for them. In a symmetric equilibrium it must be that e(n) = e, and eE(n) = eE
so that, taking into account the expression for the market wage given in (3.6), optimal,
common, effort levels (e∗, e∗E) satisfy:
σ2H
[
λ
(
1− θ¯e∗)+ α (1− θ¯e∗E)
λ+ θ¯e∗E + α
(
1− θ¯e∗E
) ]+ θ¯B = c′ (e∗) ; (3.8)
σ2H
[
λ
(
1− θ¯e∗)+ α (1− θ¯e∗E)
λ+ θ¯e∗E + α
(
1− θ¯e∗E
) ]+ αθ¯B = c′ (e∗E) . (3.9)
The following proposition characterizes some properties of effort levels exerted in the
symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique couple of optimal effort levels (e∗, e∗E), and,
if α < 1, then e∗ > e∗E . Furthermore, both e
∗ and e∗E are increasing in σ
2 and e∗E is also
increasing in α.
Proof Existence follows from a straightforward fixed point argument. Define the
function F : [1, η]2 → [1, η]2 as:
F(e, eE) =
(
c
′−1
[
σ
2
H
[
λ(1− θ¯e) + α(1− θ¯eE)
λ+ θ¯eE + α(1− θ¯eE)
]
+ θ¯B
]
, c
′−1
[
σ
2
H
[
λ(1− θ¯e) + α(1− θ¯eE)
λ+ θ¯eE + α(1− θ¯eE)
]
+ αθ¯B
])
.
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A symmetric equilibrium is then a fixed point of F , but F is a continuous function from
the compact set [1, η]2 into itself and, therefore, it clearly admits at least one fixed point.
Existence is then established. As for uniqueness, notice that from (3.8) and (3.9), any
solution (e∗, e∗E) must satisfy:
c′(e∗)− c′(e∗E) = (1− α)θ¯B. (3.10)
Assume by contradiction the existence of two different solutions (e∗, e∗E) 6= (e∗∗, e∗∗E ).
Condition (3.10) then implies that e∗ 6= e∗∗ and e∗E 6= e∗∗E . Without loss of generality,
consider e∗ > e∗∗. From condition (3.9) it follows that e∗E < e
∗∗
E , so that (e
∗, e∗E) and
(e∗∗, e∗∗E ) cannot both satisfy (3.10) which is necessary for a solution. Uniqueness, hence,
follows. The property e∗ > e∗E for α < 1 follows directly from (3.10) and the strict
convexity of c. As for comparative statics results, consider α′ > α and let (e′, e′E); (e, eE)
be corresponding optimal effort levels. Assume by contradiction that e′E ≤ eE . From (3.9)
it then follows that e′ > e which is incompatible with (3.10). Hence, e′E > eE . Other
comparative statics results are established similarly. 
According to proposition 1, non-entrenched managers exert more effort than those
who secured their position within the firm. This result is very intuitive: non-entrenched
managers exert effort for two reasons: first, to reduce the probability of being fired and,
second, to increase the probability of building a good reputation. For entrenched managers
the first incentive is less important so that their effort has a smaller marginal value and,
as a consequence, they exert less effort in equilibrium. As for comparative statics results,
notice that a larger skill volatility σ2 increases the value of a good reputation, thus making
career concerns stronger for both entrenched and non-entrenched managers. The effect
of a change in θ¯ on equilibrium effort levels is ambiguous. Expressions (3.8) and (3.9) are
quite clear on this point. The marginal value of effort is the sum of two components. First,
the marginal benefits on the labor market, measured by σ2H(.), which is decreasing in
θ¯. Second, the marginal benefits of retained control, measured by θ¯B for non-entrenched
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managers, and by αθ¯B for entrenched managers, which, on the contrary, is increasing
in θ¯. A variation in θ¯ affects then these two components in opposite directions and the
overall effect cannot be predicted. Notice however that in the extreme case α = 0, the
equilibrium effort in case of entrenchment is unambiguously decreasing in θ¯. In fact, in
this case, entrenched managers keep their job with certainty so that effort has no effect
on the probability of retaining private benefits of control. As for comparative statics with
respect to α, notice in condition (3.9) that this parameter affects directly the marginal
value of effort for entrenched managers. In particular, a larger α makes effort more
productive in keeping private benefits, then inducing a higher level in equilibrium. This
is quite intuitive: for entrenched managers the larger the probability of a takeover in case
of failure (i.e. the larger α), the stronger their incentive to be successful.15 From the other
hand, non-entrenched managers are affected by variations in α only through its effect on
the equilibrium market wage. However, this effect is ambiguous. A larger α increases the
measure of independent firms, but, through its effect on e∗E , it also increases the measure
of successful managers. The first effect tends to increase the equilibrium wage, but the
second one goes in the opposite direction, and the total effect is unpredictable. However,
if the equilibrium wage increases (decreases) because of a variation in α, the equilibrium
effort provided by non-entrenched managers also increases (decreases).
To get the analysis one step further, let w∗ = w(e∗, e∗E) be the equilibrium wage
for senior managers and define expected utilities U∗E and U
∗ for an entrenched and,
respectively, a non-entrenched manager, that is:
U∗E = θ¯e
∗
E (B + w
∗) + (1− θ¯e∗)(1− α)B − c(e∗E);
U∗ = θ¯e∗ (B + w∗)− c(e∗).
15 This effect resembles the disciplining role of takeovers analyzed by Scharfstein(1988), and it is
indeed due to a very similar mechanism: in both cases the incentive effect of takeover stems from the
existence of a raider that can replace the current board when this is ineffective. However, in the original
work by Scharfstein, the source of board incapacity is not managerial entrenchment, but the existence of
post contractual asymmetric information. The idea is that, after signing an incentive contract the CEO
may receive some new information that creates new opportunities of self dealing, not properly addressed
in the original contract.
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It is then possible to define the value of entrenchment as follows:
U∗E − U∗ = (1− θ¯e∗)(1− α)B + [c(e∗)− c(e∗E)]− θ¯ (B + w∗) (e∗ − e∗E) . (3.11)
Expression (3.11) makes it clear that an entrenched manager is partially shielded from the
possibility of losing private benefits of control, and extracts more private benefits in the
form of a smaller effort. From the other hand, reduced effort also reduces the expected
labor market benefits that accrue to successful managers. However, this cost, measured
by the term θ¯ (B + w∗) (e∗ − e∗E) has a smaller impact than the benefits associated with
a smaller effort, measured by c(e∗) − c(e∗E). Notice, in fact, that from (3.9), it results
that θ¯ (B + w∗) = c′(e∗E). Therefore, the value of entrenchment can be rewritten as:
U∗E − U∗ = (1− θ¯e∗)(1− α)B + [c(e∗)− c(e∗E)]− c′(e∗E) (e∗ − e∗E) .
As long as α < 1, the last expression is strictly positive because the term c′(e∗E) (e
∗ − e∗E) ,
measuring expected labor market loss from entrenchment, is a linear approximation of
the increment c(e∗)−c(e∗E), measuring private benefits from entrenchment. Furthermore,
the convexity of c ensures that the difference [c(e∗)− c(e∗E)] − c′(e∗E) (e∗ − e∗E) is indeed
strictly positive. A further intuition for this result is that effort level e∗ is a possible
choice also for entrenched managers. However, they prefer e∗E which, therefore, has to
make them better off. Also notice that if α = 0, condition (3.10) implies that e∗ = e∗E
so that, in this case, entrenchment has no value, i.e. U∗E = U
∗. This shows the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 If entrenchment reduces the probability of firing in case of failure,
i.e. α < 1, then the value of entrenchment is strictly positive: U∗E > U
∗.
So far I haven't analyzed the effect of changes in the probability of entrenchment
γ on the characteristics of the equilibrium, but this is the purpose of the remainder of
this section. Remember that the main interpretation of a reduction in γ is a change in
the legislation that increases the quality of corporate governance, like for example the
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introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley act in 2002, the adoption of more stringent listing re-
quirements, etc. Notice that the parameter γ affects equilibrium effort indirectly through
its effect on the equilibrium wage in the labor market. Unfortunately, as discussed at
the end of the previous section, it is impossible to derive any general comparative statics
result with respect to γ, or, equivalently, with respect to λ. The problem is that, in
general, a reduction in the probability of entrenchment, i.e. an increase in λ, has two
conflicting effects on the managerial labor market. More firms are willing to contract a
senior CEO, but more senior CEOs are available for contracting. Whether the demand
or the supply effect prevails is therefore not predictable in general terms. However, the
following proposition allows to obtain precise comparative statics result in the special case
α = 0. While certainly special, this is however an important case. In fact, throughout
the 1980s many states in the US have been adopting very strong antitakeover legislation
whose effects can be represented in this model exactly with a very small value of α.
Proposition 3 If the probability α of firing and entrenched manager in case of
failure is zero, then the equilibrium wage w∗, the equilibrium effort levels (e∗, e∗E), and
the expected utility of both entrenched and non-entrenched managers (U∗, U∗E) are all
increasing in the quality of governance, as measured by λ.
Proof Assume α = 0. Let's show first that, in this case, equilibrium effort levels
are increasing in λ. consider λ′ > λ and let (e′, e′E) ; (e, eE) be corresponding optimal
effort levels. Assume by contradiction that e′ ≤ e. From (3.9) and taking into account
that α = 0, it follows that e′E > eE which is incompatible with (3.10). Hence, e
′ > e.
Assuming e′E ≤ eE immediately produces a similar contradiction so that e′E > eE follows.
Let's show now that w∗ increases in λ. Consider again λ′ > λ and let (e′, e′E) ; (e, eE)
be corresponding optimal effort levels. We know that e′ > e and e′E > eE . Assume
by contradiction that w(e′, e′E) ≤ w(e, eE). Taking into account the expression of the
equilibrium wage (3.6), the first order condition (3.9), and the condition α = 0, it is
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possible to write:
c′(e′E) = σ
2H
[
λ(1− θ¯e′)
λ+ θ¯e′E
]
≤ σ2H
[
λ(1− θ¯e)
λ+ θ¯eE
]
= c′(eE),
then, e′E ≤ eE , which is a contradiction. The quantities U∗ and U∗E are increasing in λ
because of their definition and the envelope theorem. 
Notice that the arguments used in the proof remain valid for α positive but small
enough, because all the quantities involved, i.e e∗, e∗E , w
∗, U∗, and U∗E , are continuous
functions of α. Therefore, such comparative statics results still hold if the probability of
firing an entrenched manager is small. According to proposition 3, the model predicts
that if entrenched managers are hard to remove, for example because of strong takeover
legislation, a reduction in the probability of entrenchment increases managerial payment,
at least for managers with a good reputation. The intuition is very simple: in this case
the demand effect dominates. The prevailing effect of a better governance is then to
diminish the number of entrenched managers and, therefore, to increase the number of
firms competing for good managers. The equilibrium wage then increases as a consequence
of the increased level of competition. Hermalin (2005) establishes a similar relationship
between corporate governance quality (interpreted as board independence in his article)
and managerial pay. The argument he proposes is the following: more independent
boards are more willing to replace their CEO in case of poor performance, and, as a
result, CEOs have a shorter tenure. Therefore, to offset the cost associated with a faster
turnover, managerial compensation must increase. However, it should be noticed that this
argument applies naturally to a situation in which board independence increases in one
firm but not in the others. In fact, a manager has to be compensated for the expectation
of a shorter tenure only if there are other firms with weaker governance in which tenures
can be reasonably be expected to be longer. In other words, if a firm strengthens its
governance, while all the others do not, it is reasonable that a manager will require a
wage premium to accept the job in the firm that is getting stronger. Without such wage
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premium, the manager could prefer the outside option of working in a weaker firm. This
logic, however, does not apply to time series variation in the quality of governance when
this variations affect all the firm in roughly the same way (for example, because of a
change in the existing legislation). In fact, if working conditions become tougher (e.g.
tenures get shorter) in any firm, a manager's outside option changes exactly in the same
way as her actual working conditions. In such a situation it is not clear why managers
should receive a higher wage.16
Proposition 3 offers a different argument that exactly works when Hermalin's seems
to be less convincing. Furthermore, the proposition clarifies that the upward pressure
exercised on managerial payments by better governance, also increases the utility of both
entrenched an non-entrenched managers. Notice, however, that from an-ex ante point of
view, stronger boards means that managers can entrench themselves, then enjoying the
entrenchment value U∗E − U∗, less easily. A trade off then emerges ex-ante: if the proba-
bility of entrenchment decreases, expected labor market benefits increases, but expected
private benefits derived from entrenchment decreases.
To conclude this section let's analyze briefly the comparative statics effects of λ in
the opposite special case α = 1. As it is clear from (3.10), in this case it must be that
e∗ = e∗E , and then expression (3.11) also implies that U
∗ = U∗E . In a sense, entrenchment
is immaterial and has no effect whatsoever. This is reasonable because the condition
α = 1 exactly means that failing managers are fired with probability one, independently
of whether they are entrenched or not. We should also expect the probability of entrench-
ment, or equivalently λ, to have no effect on the equilibrium. This is indeed the case,
and, in fact, equilibrium conditions (3.8) and (3.9), with α = 1 and taking into account
that e∗ = e∗E , are both equivalent to:
σ2H
(
1− θ¯e∗)+ θ¯B = c′ (e∗) , (3.12)
16 The argument proposed by Hermalin may also fail if the employment contract leaves managers
with more than their reservation utility. Managers can extract rents through optimal contracts for several
reasons: limited liability, an established good reputation, etc. In this case, even if the improvement in
the quality of governance does not affect the value of the managerial outside option, it is not obvious
why it should increase managerial compensation.
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so that equilibrium effort levels are independent of λ. The same is true for the equilibrium
wage which is given by:
w∗ =
σ2
θ¯
H
(
1− θ¯e∗) . (3.13)
A similar result obtains when α < 1 but γ = 0. In this case, entrenched managers do
secure their position to some extent but entrenchment has zero probability ex-ante, and
it is irrelevant in determining the expected equilibrium wage in the labor market. In
fact, it is immediate to check that, in this case, condition (3.12) defines optimal effort for
non-entrenched managers, and condition (3.13) defines the equilibrium wage. However,
equilibrium effort for entrenched managers is now defined by:
σ2H
(
1− θ¯e∗)+ αθ¯B = c′ (e∗E) .
The value of α does have an effect on the equilibrium effort exerted by entrenched man-
agers, but entrenchment occurs with probability zero so that α does not affect the equi-
librium wage and the equilibrium effort exerted by non-entrenched managers.
3.5. Conclusion
This paper analyzed the interaction between managerial entrenchment, compensation
and career concerns. Contrary to most of the existent literature on boards, the analysis
is at a market level, and it allows to identify effects that are not immediately evident at
the firm level. In particular, entrenchment was shown to affect the market for CEOs and,
therefore, the strength of managerial career concerns. Less entrenchment increases the
competition for CEOs on the demand side, but it also increase the competition among
CEOs on the supply side, and the total effect is not predictable in general terms. However,
when the probability of dismissal of an entrenched manager is low, for example because
of a strong legal protection against hostile takeover, the demand side effect dominates,
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and less entrenchment unambiguously increases the equilibrium managerial payment, thus
having a beneficial effect of career concerns.
To focus on these market effects, the analysis treats in a very simple way the conse-
quences of entrenchment: it just makes it harder to remove an incumbent CEO. Of course,
such effects would also be present in a more realistic treatment in which for example, as
in Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), friendly boards were less willing to monitor their CEO.
The theoretical findings suggest that the steady increase in managerial compensation
observed in the last 20 years can be explained, at least partially, with a corresponding
steady improvement in board independence. According to this point of view, the increased
level of managerial pay is due to increased competition for good CEOs, and it should also
have produced stronger career concerns for young generations of managers.
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